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Summary 
The purpose of this study was to describe the factors that led to the creation of 
warlords in Angola and Sierra Leone so as to better understand the dynamics and 
origins of warlord politics. The two warlords that were focused on, and compared, 
were Jonas Savimbi (Angola) and Charles Taylor (Liberia and Sierra Leone).  
 
Authors like Mary Kaldor (2006), William Reno (1995, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 
2007) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) contributed toward the base of this study. 
Their work captured the issues contributing toward the warlord phenomenon and 
generated thought surrounding the context in which these warlords arose. John 
Mackinlay (2000) was used to describe and analyse the origins of warlordism and 
how the warlord phenomenon has changed with the onset of new wars, especially in 
the late 20th and 21st centuries (Kaldor, 2006). Furthermore, the work of Thomas H. 
Greene (1984) was used in guiding this thesis into a systematic study, focusing 
mainly on the leadership, following, organization, techniques and external support of 
both Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor as examples of contemporary warlords.  
 
Through utilizing the contributions of the above authors on this topic, the similarities 
and differences between the two warlords were explored. The study found that 
while Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor emerged from different eras and contexts 
(Savimbi out of the Cold War and Taylor as a result of globalization), they both 
became typical warlords. Savimbi only became a warlord after 1992. Before, Savimbi 
used Maoist ideology while an insurgent against Portugal, whereafter he became a 
rebel in the Angolan civil war. Taylor was a warlord in diamond-rich neighbouring 
Sierra Leone. Both used identity politics to gather a following while Taylor used brute 
force and the manipulation of the youth. They both manipulated illicit criminal 
networking and operated internationally, smuggling diamonds. The main difference, 
however, is that Taylor was an insurgent in Liberia where he seized power in 1990 
and became president in 1997, while a warlord in neighbouring Sierra Leone. 
Savimbi, on the other hand, never attained presidential power even though he 
participated in the 1992 Angolan elections which he lost, whereafter he ceased to be 
a revolutionary, and became a real warlord without the external support he 
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previously had. Savimbi was assassinated in 2002 and Taylor abdicated in 2003, 
currently standing trial in the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. He 
stands trial for the human right atrocities committed in Sierra Leone. Their legacies 
live on. 
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Opsomming 
Die doel van hierdie studie was om die faktore te beskryf wat gely het tot die 
ontstaan van krygshere (“warlords“)in Angola en Sierra Leone, en om die dinamika 
van krygsheerpolitiek beter te verstaan. Die twee krygshere waarop gefokus en 
vergelyk was, is Jonas Savimbi (Angola) en Charles Taylor (Liberië en Sierra Leone).  
Die denke van skrywers soos Mary Kaldor (2006), William Reno (1995, 1997, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2006, 2007) en Collier & Hoeffler (2004) het bygedra tot die basis van 
hierdie studie. Hulle werk het ingesluit die aspekte wat bygedra het tot die krygsheer 
fenomeen, en het besinning aangemoedig oor die agtergrondsfaktore waaruit hierdie 
twee krygshere ontstaan het.  
 
John Mackinlay (2000) se werk is gebruik om die oorsprong van krygsheerpolitiek te 
beskryf, asook hoe die krygsheerfenomeen verander het met die uitbreek van “nuwe 
oorloë“ (Kaldor, 2006), veral aan die einde van die 20ste en 21ste eeue. Verder is 
die werk van Thomas H. Greene (1984) gebruik om hierdie tesis ‘n sistematiese 
struktuur te gee wat gefokus is op die leierskap, volgelinge, organisasie, tegnieke en 
eksterne ondersteuning van Jonas Savimbi en Charles Taylor. Hierdie twee persone 
is albei voorbeelde van kontemporêre krygshere in die jongste verlede.  
 
‘n Vergelykende studie verg dat ooreenkomste en verskille tussen die twee 
krygshere verken word deur gebruik te maak van die bydraes van bogenoemde 
skrywers. In die studie is bevind dat alhoewel Jonas Savimbi en Charles Taylor uit 
verskillende eras en agtergrond kom (Savimbi uit die Koue Oorlog en Taylor as 
gevolg van globalisasie), albei tipiese krygshere geword het. Savimbi het Maoistiese 
ideologie gebruik terwyl hy ’n insurgent teen Portugal was. Daarná het hy ’n rebel in 
die Angolese burgeroorlog geword. Hy het eers na 1992 ‘n krygsheer geword nadat 
hy die verkiesing verloor het en sy buitelandse steun verloor het. Taylor, aan die 
ander kant, was ‘n krygsheer in die diamantryke buurland, Sierra Leone. Altwee 
krygshere het identiteitspolitiek gebruik om volgelinge te kry, terwyl Taylor ook 
brutale krag en die manipulasie van die jeug gebruik het. Hulle het beide 
internasionale diamante gesmokkel deur kriminele netwerke te gebruik. Die groot 
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verskil is egter dat terwyl Taylor ‘n krygsheer in Sierra Leone was, was hy ook ‘n 
insurgent in Liberië, waar hy in 1990 mag gekry het en in 1997 president geword 
het.  
 
Savimbi, aan die ander kant, het nooit presidensiële mag verkry nie, alhoewel hy 
deelgeneem het aan die 1992 Angolese verkiesing. Hy het daarna opgehou om ‘n 
revolusionêr en ‘n rebel te wees en het ‘n ware krygsheer geword (sonder die 
eksterne ondersteuning wat hy voorheen gehad het). Savimbi is in 2002 vermoor en 
Taylor het in 2003 abdikeer. Taylor is tans onder verhoor in Den Haag waar hy tereg 
staan by die Internasionale Strafhof vir oorlogsmisdade en menseregteskendings in 
Sierra Leone. Beide hierdie krygshere se nalatenskap leef egter voort.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Problem Statement 
Mary Kaldor in her work on “New and Old Wars” (Kaldor, 2006:15-110) describes 
how war has changed from a Clausewitzian “Trinitarian” type of war to a more basic, 
ruthless and lawless type of war in the 21st century. Her New War theory uses Van 
Creveld’s work on “The Transformation of War” (Van Creveld, 1991:40). Kaldor 
delves into the idea of a “war economy” and describes how warlords and other 
‘strong men’ feed on the war environment. This is also where Collier and Hoeffler’s 
(2004) argument on “greed and grievance” provides further explanation for the 
reasons for civil war in Africa. Reno (2001:3) argues that looting and personal 
profiteering is not new. However what is new is the increasingly greater role 
economic interests play in internal wars, especially in Africa.  
 
Clausewitz pointed out that war is a “social activity” (Kaldor, 2006:15). According to 
Kaldor, war has passed through several stages since the fifteenth century. It is 
therefore a phenomenon that “was intimately bound up with the evolution of the 
modern state” (Kaldor, 2006:15). 
 
1.1.1.  Kaldor on “New Wars” 
Kaldor describes how mercenary armies were created through the support by 
monarchs in the early stages of European state formation after 1648. The 
centralization of state power meant that a firm economic base to support these 
mercenary armies was created through taxation, bourgeoisie support and custom 
duties (Kaldor, 2006:18). 
 
However, these mercenary armies tended to be unreliable and were often released 
from their duties as soon as the war was over. This meant that in their “off season” 
mercenaries would find “less savory”  ways of making a living (Kaldor, 2006:19). The 
solution was to create “standing armies” that could be relied upon and which were 
professional and trained. A new type of organization emerged with the formation of 
standing armies. Uniforms were introduced and the separation between civilian and 
soldier was established. Standing armies were thus under the control of the state. 
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Hence, state interest became the legitimate justification for war (Kaldor, 2006:19).  
 
According to Clausewitz the traditional form of war was fought between state 
against state and army against army. It was therefore governments and not people 
who made and declared war. Armies acted as organizations that served 
governments. Soldiers were therefore given a “licence” to kill; they were regulated, 
controlled and marked in order for the authorities to inhibit atrocities from being 
committed outside of the law (Van Creveld, 1991:40).  
 
The standing armies brought about numerous changes within the economy. 
Financing for the armies derived from taxation and borrowing (Kaldor, 2006:20). 
This in turn led to banking systems in order for the king’s finances to be separated 
from the state’s finances. 
 
Clausewitz states that war is a rational decision made by the state. However Van 
Creveld and Kaldor argue that there must be more “emotive” causes for men to go 
to war (Kaldor, 2006:21). The evolving of war from the Middle Ages toward the end 
of the 18th century witnessed the emergence of the state, after the Peace of 
Westphalia. A number of distinctions emerged with this new organization. A 
distinction between public and private, economics and politics, internal and external 
activity of the state, and civilian and soldier, was established (Kaldor, 2006:22). 
 
Clausewitz further argues in his work ‘Vom Kriege’ that war is “an act of violence 
carried to its utmost bounds” (Van Creveld, 1991:63). It is absolute with the use of 
extreme force between two opponents. Hence war was a discrete event including 
friction and force and the overwhelming use of force, the application of force and 
the mobilization of force. Hence Clausewitzian Trinitarianism argues that “war is a 
means to an end” (Van Creveld, 1991:124). He argued that politicians used war as a 
means to an end, using “bullets” as their grammar (Van Creveld, 1991:124). In 
other words, war is subject to politics and exists to serve the will of the politician. 
 
In reality, wars evolved from the rule of the papal authority to standing armies 
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where rules, organization and discipline were key to serve the purpose of the 
politician, and since 1648, the state. 
 
The late 20th century saw a new type of warfare emerge. According to Kaldor, this 
new concept and its development went hand in hand with the increasing globalizing 
of society: Kaldor refers to this new phenomenon as “new wars”, characterised by 
new factors. According to Kaldor this new type of warfare has to be understood in 
line with globalization. Globalization is breaking up the “cultural and socio-economic 
divisions that define the patterns of politics which characterize the modern period” 
(Kaldor, 2006:73). 
 
“New forms of power struggle may take the guise of traditional nationalism, tribalism 
or religious fundamentalism, but they are, nevertheless, contemporary phenomena 
arising from contemporary causes and displaying new characteristics” (Kaldor, 
2006:73). 
 
Similar to Van Creveld, Kaldor argues that the role of the state is changing as these 
new social movements arise. Non-governmental organizations are beginning to play 
a much greater role than the state in the globalized world. Van Creveld argues that 
the future of war will be much like the past ( i.e. pre 1648). The Clausewitzian model 
of distinction between state, government and the people is and will no longer be 
applicable to future warfare. The rise of low intensity conflict is predicted to destroy 
the state as we know it. It is argued that the state will be replaced by organizations 
other than the state. The state as a war phenomenon is on its way out because “its 
ability to fight organizations similar to itself is increasingly in doubt, and because 
there is not much point being loyal to an organization that does not, cannot and will 
not fight” (Van Creveld, 1991:194). 
 
In the same breath Kaldor speaks about horizontal and vertical cultures (Kaldor, 
2006:75). In other words two types of cultures exist, vertically organized cultures 
and the new phenomenon replacing the latter, horizontal cultures. Horizontal 
structures evolve out of transnational networking. These structures are focused 
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mostly around the English language. There are thus new identities forming while old 
‘ancient’ identities fade. 
 
Furthermore, Kaldor argues that globalization involves “globalization and localization” 
(Kaldor, 2006:75). On the one hand, new transnational global networks are evolving 
which have great potential; while on the other hand, a large majority of the world is 
excluded and remains localized and marginalized. Great economic change has also 
been brought about by globalization including the capitalist economy, and on the 
negative side, the opening up of infant industries in the developing world to the 
global market tides. The establishment of new social classes, within old identities 
worldwide, has meant a greater disparity between rich and poor within the same 
nation. Globalization has meant a variety of changes within politics and economics, 
as well as the relationship between the two.  
 
A new kind of politics thus emerged because of the process of globalization and 
identity politics. This can be seen as a form of political mobilization because of the 
“growing impotence of the modern state” (Kaldor, 2006:79). According to Kaldor, 
identity politics is; 
 
“...the movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the 
purpose of claiming state power” (Kaldor, 2006:80). 
 
Identity according to Kaldor is a given. It is a birthright. She draws a contrast 
between “labels” and “identity”, arguing that people or groups of people are often 
afraid of what is “foreign” or different, in other words “different labels” (Kaldor, 
2006:81). Identity can be based on a certain group’s heroic history, famous battles 
and memories of injustice (Kaldor, 2006:81). Identity acquires meaning through 
insecurity, fear and historic enemies (Kaldor, 2006:81). Identity politics also 
generates a minority and at best identity politics involves psychological 
discrimination against those labelled differently and at worst it leads to genocide, as 
was the case in Rwanda, according to Kaldor (2006:81). 
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The new type of identity politics is a result of the disintegration of the modern state 
and can be a direct result of authoritarian regimes (Kaldor, 2006:82). Therefore, 
new identity politics stems from two places. It can be a reaction against the 
declining legitimacy of the established political classes or it is a reaction towards the 
fears created through globalization (Kaldor, 2006:82). Kaldor also focuses on what 
can be described as the “parallel economy” (Kaldor, 2006:82). The parallel economy 
is the new form of “black market” economy that has evolved out of the unequal 
consequences of globalization. In this parallel economy new types of illegal 
characters evolve. This could be in the form of warlords, drug lords and other 
‘shadowy’ forms of activity (Kaldor, 2006:82). This “parallel economy” is one source 
of the rising warlord phenomenon and was a consequence of the end of the Cold 
War and African independence from colonial rule.  
 
States in Africa have had a difficult time coping with their independence. Along with 
this, the end of the Cold War meant a sudden extraction of immense foreign support 
by the USA and the Soviet Union: 
 
“States in Africa had to cope with the disillusion of post independence hopes, the 
failure of the development project to overcome poverty and inequality, the insecurity 
of rapid urbanization and the breakup of traditional rural communities, as well as the 
impact of SAPs and policies of stabilization, liberalization and deregulation” 
(Kaldor,2006:84). 
 
National identity is different to other identities previously discussed. It is somehow 
“pure and unattained” (Kaldor, 2006:84). As soon as most African states became 
apprehensive after independence, many states started to focus on “particularistic 
tendencies” (Kaldor, 2006:85). The weaker the administration of the state, the 
greater the tendencies toward authoritarian regimes. Some African countries which 
were labelled predatory states (Sudan and Nigeria among others) developed a 
system where wealth was given to specific tribes and religions. These states had 
strong interventionist policies. However, with the extraction of foreign support, the 
states soon fell into debt and heavy borrowing. This resulted in the introduction of 
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Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Most African states could not implement 
SAPs because of their weak beaurocracies and inadequate infrastructure. Slowly, 
state revenues declined and controversy over resources increased as everyone tried 
to make their last profit. In other words, the end of the Cold War only brought about 
the effects of the debt problem earlier in Africa. Increased pressure from the West 
for Africa’s democratization meant that leaders in power had to try a different angle 
to stay in power, hence the introduction of identity politics based on race, ethnicity 
and religion. 
 
The policies imposed on Africa by the West IFIs created even greater disparities 
since Africa’s infrastructure could not cope with the demands. Urbanization and the 
parallel economy brought about insecurity within identity politics (Kaldor, 2006:87). 
The new economy, including Neo-liberal policies and liberalization speeded up 
unemployment, privatization and deregulation (Kaldor, 2006:87). These Western 
policies led to further criminalization and the creation of the “shadow economy”. 
Since African states had a mostly interventionist policy, the state prior to the end of 
the Cold War had a heavy hand within the market. The extraction of foreign support 
and the effects of globalization meant that ‘shady businessmen’ were evolving out of 
this deal. Hence, a new era emerged where these local strong men used identity 
politics to gain support and to sustain their businesses. These men often have 
transnational networks and were vibrant in the illegal trades. In Kaldor’s words: 
“These groups feed like vultures on the disintegrating state and the poor and 
vulnerable” (Kaldor, 2006:87). 
 
The new identity politics as a result of the end of the Cold War and the extraction of 
support, meant that leaders faced an uncertain future. In order to stay in power, 
these leaders made connections with shady characters on the periphery of society. 
This in turn led to the misuse of identity politics based on ethnicity to gain support to 
stay in power. In other words: “The greater the sense of insecurity the greater the 
polarization of society” (Kaldor, 2006:88). 
 
In line with Van Creveld’s argument on new wars, new identity politics is often 
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regarded as a return to the past, a “return to pre-modern identities temporarily 
displaced or suppressed by modernizing ideologies” (Kaldor, 2006:88). Kaldor argues 
that what really matters in new identity politics is globalization and the recent past. 
She argues that Diasporas are playing an increasingly important role in supporting 
these local shady leaders. Diaspora groups provide resources, arms and money. 
They may include foreign mercenaries, dealers or investors (Kaldor, 2006:88). 
Similar support is also found among new transnational social groups transcending 
geographical boundaries because of technology. In this sense, religious groups, such 
as Islamic groups can be connected through technology. 
 
It is important to now turn attention to the “war economy”. The new types of wars 
as mentioned previously are globalized and they prey on the disintegration of the 
modern state. Violence is mostly directed toward civilians and cooperation between 
these parties in war is vivid. The survival of the parties involved is dependent on the 
success of the war economy (Kaldor, 2006:95). Many states within Africa have 
become so disintegrated that the term “failed state” comes to mind.  
 
There are various arguments about “failed states”. Normally failed states would 
describe “countries with weak or non-existent central authority” (Kaldor, 2006:96). 
Jeffrey Herbst argues that “many African states never enjoyed state sovereignty in 
the modern sense” (Kaldor, 2006:97). William Reno (1995:110) on the other hand 
argues that instead of seeing Africa as a cluster of failed states, these states are 
actually in the transition to a non-bureaucratic form of state building which 
generates a different type of political authority. This political authority is often based 
on patronage. Rulers therefore govern through non-bureaucratic elite networks, 
generating political and economic support, while having no regard for “conventional 
institutional notions” and formal politics. 
 
According to Kaldor (2006:97), one key characteristic of a failed state is the 
“disintegration of the state itself and the failure of the state to take control over 
physical coercion”. However, the opposite occurs in this sense of state formation, 
instead of building the state in a cycle of sets, a chain reaction is sustained through 
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disintegrating the state. In other words, the failure of the state to function is a result 
of the economic base slowly deteriorating since no taxes or revenues are available 
for collection. This in turn leads to personalistic rule and local strong men creating 
more illegal ways to finance their economies. Kaldor (2006:97) also draws a 
comparison between the state formation of 18th century in Europe and unreliable tax 
collection through hired private firms in the 21st century. 
 
The vicious cycle continues with the loss of state legitimacy and the incompetence of 
the state to protect its citizens. New forces emerge to claim “protection money” 
which leads to foreign pressure to cut government spending. This then results in loss 
of control over military units. Outside assistance has too many conditions which 
Africans states cannot commit too, hence foreign demands are not met. In sum; 
 
“A downward spiral of loss of revenue and legitimacy, growing disorder, and military 
fragmentation creates the context in which the new wars take place. Effectively, the 
‘failure’ of the state is accompanied by a growing privatization of violence” (Kaldor, 
2006:97). 
 
As mentioned previously “new wars” are global and go hand in hand with the 
disintegration of the state. Kaldor identifies a multiplicity of the types of fighting 
units: 
 
“…regular armed forces or remnants thereof, paramilitary groups, self defence units, 
foreign mercenaries, and finally, regular foreign troops, generally under international 
auspices” (Kaldor, 2006:97). 
 
The state’s disintegration and lack of legitimacy has led to the decay of regular 
armed forces. This is because the state can no longer provide legitimate financial 
support for the army. The soldiers therefore do not receive an income and have to 
find other illegal means to an end. This further leads to fragmentation within the 
army which spirals into fragmentation within society (Kaldor, 2006:98). The former 
regular armed forces therefore lose their credibility as soldiers along with the state, 
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since the state can no longer provide protection for their citizens. This leads to 
former armies evolving into private paramilitary groups (Kaldor, 2006:98). These 
groups are most common and usually revolve around one leader. These factions lack 
legitimacy, order and hierarchy and are often unorganized. This often leads to 
rebellion within the army as well as within society. 
 
1.1.2.  Collier and Hoeffler on “Greed and Grievance”  
 “Rebellion needs both motive and opportunity”  (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:563).  
 
Grossman in Collier and Hoeffler (2004:564) argues from the basis of an economic 
theory, and states that rebellion is an “industry” which uses illegal ways for profit, 
looting among others, to feed its greed. Therefore, if the opportunity for profit 
through rebellion presents itself, it will not be passed up. On the other hand, motive 
cannot be measured, hence the focus on opportunity and rebellion. In other words, 
it is the “atypical circumstances” that bring about the opportunity for rebellion which 
further leads to profit and greed.  
 
There are certain groups within society that sustain conflict (Nitzschke & Studdard, 
2005:223). These groups benefit from the opportunities presented through conflict 
and rebellion. They usually include government elite, military elite and local 
businessmen.  
 
Angola fits this description. There was an anti-Portuguese revolution fought by three 
sets of insurgents. Savimbi’s UNITA was one of them. However, when the liberation 
war was over (1974-1975), Savimbi turned into a rebel, sustaining his fighting 
through diamonds and ivory. This is where greed manifested strongly. As the Cold 
War ended, Savimbi’s American supporters saw Angola’s peace as a passport to 
Angolan oil. Savimbi was discarded after he lost the presidential elections in 
2002.The rebel turned into a warlord until his death in 2002.  
 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004:588) found that a factor influencing the opportunity for 
rebellion is the availability of finance. Resources and the “primary commodity 
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exports” increase the risk of conflict. In Angola, diamonds and ivory were the main 
resources while in West Africa, it was only diamonds. This joins in with the argument 
that when the opportunity for economic gain presents itself, greed steps in. Another 
explanation is that primary commodity dependence worsens governance and so 
generates stronger grievances (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:588). Grievance is about 
exploitation, inequality, poverty and deprivation. Poor nations, with rich resources, 
become victims of these struggles.  
 
The risk of conflict goes hand in hand with the growth of the population. As the 
population increases so do grievances and heterogeneity (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004:588). Diasporas play a large role in sustaining this economy, neglecting the 
poor. Diasporas “support the opportunity interpretation” (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004:589).  
 
1.1.3.  William Reno on West Africa 
William Reno (2001) highlights factors making for weak states and conflicts within 
those states that are mainly about scarce resource. He focuses on Liberia and Sierra 
Leone.   
 
Special units arose in the dire political and economic conditions in both Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. The aim of these units was to distribute weapons and military training 
within their immediate societies. Within this context of a fragmented military and 
disintegrated state, warlords arose as described by Kaldor (2006) and more 
specifically by Mackinlay (2000).  
 
Mackinlay (2000:1) writes that warlords emerged in China after the fall of the Qing 
dynasty in 1911. Warlords were former military commanders that tried to hold their 
own territory but seldom tried to capture state power. This was made possible 
through them operating through weak states, “power vacuums”, where they acted 
without interference from the state. Their purpose was to control their territories, 
and profit from conflict. They became the “hyenas of the conflict zone” (Mackinlay, 
2000:3), not relying on popular loyalties, but often on manipulation and fear. William 
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Reno (2001) describes and analyses warlords in West Africa. For Reno, warlordism is 
about vague nationalism, the manipulation of markets, armed youths, commercial 
networks and the role of scarce resources, especially diamonds, in West Africa. It is 
concentrated on the politics of patronage, without administration and ideology, 
focusing only on illicit capital.  
 
 “The ruler increasingly operates like a racketeer, selling exemption from prosecution 
or using his control over the state to help his business partners” (Reno, 2001:4).  
 
Faulty international businesses often look for such rulers, since norms, rules and 
laws do not apply. According to Reno, “patronage-based regimes are based on 
wholly different objectives and structures” (Reno, 2001:4). The main aim of this type 
of regime is to create division among the opposition and to reward loyal supporters 
accordingly. The disintegration of society is inhibiting any form of self-sufficiency, 
such as privatization of benefits among the population. The population is kept under 
a watchful eye, not allowing any form of freedom.  
 
“Nearly all the ‘warlords’ in Somalia, Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, and Liberia once held 
high positions in the governments they later attacked, and had developed important 
commercial connections as part of an old patronage network” (Reno, 2001:4). 
 
These connections are extremely valuable, acting as “raw materials” for these 
leaders in their search for power and money.  
 
The ruthless leaders often attract “young, economically vulnerable men who seek 
economic opportunity via association with insurgents” (Reno, 2001:5). Young men 
often join these groups in search of a way to better their socio-economic situation. 
For some men, joining these armed bands is a way of escape and a hope for a 
better future after the war. Willing and impoverished men recruit unavailable child 
soldiers, often through  brutality and intimidation. 
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Those with the best developed international and commercial contacts turn out to be 
the best insurgents and rebels. Weapons are easily accessed because of 
international contacts and business. In addition, weapons are easier to distribute 
because of commercial contacts. Reno states that a successful insurgent must use 
“extreme violence” as to intimidate their rivals using commercial resources, while 
also generating a following through fear (Reno, 2001:6).Hence; 
 
 “…the most typical followers of warlords are young men (and some young women) 
who use warfare as an opportunity to enrich themselves” (Reno, 2001:6).  
 
Most of these followers are from minority groups, often in collapsing societies and 
economies. Hence, warlords create economic opportunity out of the deteriorating 
situation. Similar to Collier and Hoeffler, Reno argues that grievance plays an 
important role in the men’s motivation to join these groups. This could be as a result 
of their weak socio-economic condition and their hatred for the government. There 
are some insurgent groups who have to prey on their societies for support and then 
there are others who need the support of their communities to reign. A core 
characteristic of an insurgent group is therefore: 
 
“…their ability to get and use superior weaponry, and their capacity to cause 
disorder, manipulating international mediation” (Reno, 2001:6).  
 
According to Chabal (2000) there are three important elements to Reno’s theory, 
namely the distinction between private and public interest that has ceased to exist, 
the fact that inhabitants of a given territory no longer ‘enjoy’ security by right of 
membership in a state, and the situation that politics has become “commercialized” 
(Chabal, 2000:409). Reno analyses what has happened in a number of African 
countries where the state has ceased to function. He develops a model of how 
politics can function informally without operating within and through the context of a 
legitimate bureaucracy. 
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Moreover, instead of seeing Africa as a cluster of failed states, it is argued that these 
states are actually in the transition from a non-bureaucratic form of state into a 
different type of political authority. Rulers therefore govern through non-
bureaucratic elite networks, generating political and economic support, while having 
no regard for “conventional institutional notions” (Reno, 1995:110). Reno focuses on 
Sierra Leone and Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and his ally, Charles 
Taylor. Taylor, at one time, became President of Liberia, but in Sierra Leone, Taylor 
acted as a warlord.  
 
1.2. Purpose and Significance  
The purpose of this thesis is to describe the factors that led to the creation of 
warlords in Angola and Sierra Leone so as to better understand the dynamics and 
origins of warlord politics. In both cases “new wars” evolved, while at the same time 
these two countries posed as good examples of weak states. The rich resources 
created a chain reaction leading to resource wars over scarce and lucrative 
commodities such as diamonds in both Angola and Sierra Leone, and ivory as well in 
the case of Angola. Actors involved were almost always driven by greed or 
grievance. This included organised crime networks, mercenaries, profiteering 
politicians, and warlords. Thomas H. Greene and his work “Comparative 
revolutionary movements: Search for theory and justice” published by Prentice Hall 
in 1984, will be used as a tool in comparing Taylor and Savimbi as warlords.  
 
Although this was published long before the emergence of warlordism in Africa, the 
significance of this study is that the criteria used remain valid for an in-depth 
comparative assessment of the similarities and especially of the differences between 
Savimbi and Taylor, as leaders of their respective organizations, UNITA and the 
RUF/NPFL. These criteria can be applied to other case studies as well. Savimbi 
himself was a revolutionary before he became a rebel in the Angolan civil war while 
Taylor also underwent training as a revolutionary. Are they typical revolutionaries, or 
will they be remembered  for what they turned out to be: greedy warlords? 
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1.3. Research Methods 
The study focuses on two warlords (Savimbi and Taylor), their backgrounds, 
similarities and differences. Hence, it is a comparative literature study. No empirical 
research in the form of questionnaires or fieldwork was used. It is a qualitative study 
through the use of historical analysis. The study focused on warlordism through 
comparing Charles Taylor, a more contemporary warlord, and Jonas Savimbi a 
former revolutionary and rebel. Warlordism and the actors which play a role in 
informal politics, and illicit economics, were analysed through the use of Mary 
Kaldor’s (2006) work on “new wars”, Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) work on “greed 
and grievance” and Reno’s theory on informal politics in West Africa (2001) and 
Chabal (2000). While Mackinlay (2000) set a framework in which the origins of 
warlordism was described, the work of Thomas H. Greene was useful on the 
dynamics of revolutionary movements. His characteristics were used to set the 
criteria for a thorough comparison and analysis of these two warlords.  
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2. “New Wars”, with special reference to Angola and Sierra Leone/Liberia 
 
2.1. Factors 
2.1.1. Criteria for analysis  
Kaldor (2006) describes how war changed from “old”  to “new” wars with the onset 
of the 21st century. She focuses on the changing role of the state and the increasing 
power of the war economy, in the context of globalization. The focus is placed on 
other actors taking over the role of the state. The inability to take control of physical 
coercion is a result of the failed state (Kaldor, 2006:97). Culture also changes. She 
shows that new cultures are overtaking “old” ones and therefore new identities are 
forming. This causes the disintegration of the typical state.  
 
William Reno focuses on a different aspect of Kaldor’s “new war” theory (Reno, 
1995:110). He delves into the idea of the “failed state” and argues that supposed 
“failed states” create different forms of political authority, including warlords. In 
support of Kaldor, Reno agrees that the war economy and globalization could lead to 
the breakdown of the state. The war economy is dependent on the decreasing role 
and power of the state as a functioning legitimate body. Extreme violence executed 
through private militias and gangs are important features of the new war economy. 
This enables fear to rule the lives of civilians, creating an opportunity for warlords in 
a weak state to seize valuable resources.  
  
Reno also emphasises elite networks, whereas Kaldor provides more of a framework 
in which these networks operate. These authors thus emphasise the war economy 
and the consequential vicious cycle that follows, namely, the breakdown and loss of 
legitimacy of the state. They agree that the distinction between private and public, 
between soldier and civilian, has become blurred with the onset of “new wars”. More 
specifically, Reno (2001) focuses on vague nationalism, the manipulation of markets, 
armed youth and commercial conflict.  
 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004:564) also focus on the main concept of the war economy. 
However they take a different approach towards this phenomenon. They point 
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toward greed and grievance, stating that if the economic opportunity presents itself 
in a degenerating and collapsing society, greed arises. On the other hand, grievance 
is experienced by the masses, mainly in the form of wide-spread poverty and 
exclusion. Apart from greed and grievance, they also focus on the role of primary 
commodities, low education levels, demographics and economic decline in these 
weak states.  
Paul Collier’s work is about “rethinking conflict” rather than “thinking new conflicts” 
(Marchal, 2004:1). Rebellions according to Collier are “predatory and criminal”. 
Marchal (2004:3) argues that Collier views rebellion “as a large scale predation of 
productive economic activities”.  Collier in Marchal (2004:4) thus emphasizes the 
relationship between the government and insurgency groups. He refers to this as 
“legalized predation” where the government heavily taxes primary commodities, in 
order to finance government elite (Marchal, 2004:4). For him, rebel groups are the 
catalysts that lead to civil war. For civil wars to take place, scarce resources, the 
necessity for rebellion to finance itself, and greed,  have to be present. The state is 
therefore never the instigator of a civil war, but merely reacts to rebels (Marchal, 
2004:5).  
Reno (2006:28) explores the reason why rulers intentionally undermine their own 
state agencies, the reason being that many post-colonial rulers thus adopted a 
“vague nationalist” agenda. As many African rulers did not know how to govern an 
African state in the post-colonial era, they simply adopted an agenda that would 
please foreign aid donors and other alliances. This agenda proposed a framework of 
economic self-sufficiency and non-alignment (Reno, 2006:29). The post-Cold War 
era brought about this kind of change in policy. In the 1980s, outsiders withdrew 
their support, while the new free-market strategy did not address many of the 
problems facing African states. African states could therefore not hold their weakly 
institutionalized states together (Reno, 2006:29).   
Strong patronage networks started to play an increasingly important role in the 
context of the fragmentation of the state’s control over law and order. Patronage-
networks ensured that the elite and their assets stayed in their control. This personal 
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power base “undermines the state capacity to provide services to the wider 
population” (Reno, 2006:30). Reform becomes extremely difficult once patronage 
networks have infiltrated the system. The political section that provides reform is 
poisoned by a patronage network providing only for the elite. The state then feared 
that in focusing capital on service delivery, and not on managing local strongmen, 
they may lose the power to control (Reno, 2006:30). Moreover, such rulers 
manipulated markets to manage clients and to deny resources to their opposition 
(Reno, 2006:31). The rulers used their personal networks in the place of state 
institutions. In this way, rulers manipulate their authority to declare illegal activities, 
legal. Reno further states that it is not the presence of resources that causes 
predation, but rather the patronage-based political system that fragments the 
coercion of the state in order to protect itself (Reno, 2006:32).  
 
Bøås and Dunn in “African Guerrillas” (2007:1), take a more holistic approach to 
guerrilla movements and insurgencies in Africa. They provide a different approach to 
the “greed based” argument, stating that insurgencies and guerrilla movements are 
historically grounded. Therefore, the authors state that Collier and Hoeffler’s focus 
on greed and grievance is too narrow and does not take into account the “long 
historical trends, diverse social forces, political motivations, and regional dimensions”  
that make up African conflicts (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:9).  
Violent non-state actors and insurgencies have occupied the centre stage of conflict 
in Africa (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:9). Historically, however, African insurgencies have 
had a poor success rate, even though they have been abundant in Africa since the 
Cold War.  
 
They disagree that all conflicts in Africa are “resource wars” and argue that this 
“greed kills” argument is too narrow in explaining the complexity of African wars 
(Bøås & Dunn, 2007:10). The “greed kills” argument states that wars in Africa are 
fought for profit and not for political gain. The argument therefore lacks depth since 
it assumes that “theft and predation are the reasons for the guerrilla struggle” (Bøås 
& Dunn, 2007:11). It does not explain how the conflict originated but explains  why 
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it continues. The authors argue that the “resource war” in Sierra Leone, for example,  
only became a ‘resource war’ once the conflict was well underway. It was therefore 
not the source of the conflict. Furthermore, the “greed kills” argument does not 
explain the conflict in full. For this to occur, a shift in focus on the “political, cultural, 
and historical factors in addition to the economic dimensions of conflict” has to occur 
(Bøås & Dunn, 2007:11). Solely greed arguments are considered to be “one sided” 
according to Bøås and Dunn.  
 
The authors disagree as well, to an extent, with Kaldor on her theory on “new wars”. 
She stated that changes in the global economy have given rise to “new wars” (Bøås 
& Dunn, 2007:10). However, the authors agree with Kaldor that changes in the 
global environment have provided a greater variety of opportunities to insurgencies. 
This has given insurgents the ability to connect to transnational actors and establish 
networks in order to exploit regional “economic markets” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:10).  
All these authors touch on the relationship between power and population. Power 
equals greed and population equals grievance. An increasing population thus 
stimulates heterogeneity which increases grievance, eventually contributing to the 
war economy. Moreover, it is argued that rebellion is an industry and there are elite 
groups that sustain the conflict. The authors agree that Diasporas help to sustain the 
conflict: they may be part of the smuggling networks and sustain actors at home 
through remittances. They therefore point to the role of outside markets and 
criminal networks in sustaining African conflicts. 
2.1.2. “New War” zones in Angola: the factors  
The rule of the Portuguese stripped Angola of many of its people, sending them as 
slaves to Brazil. Resources such as oil, coffee, diamonds and ivory were major 
commodities in colonial Angola. Three factions emerged out of the colonial struggle, 
based around three different ethnic groups. This created conflict between the FNLA 
(National Liberation Front of Angola), MPLA (Popular Liberation Movement of 
Angola), UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and the 
colonial administration since the 1960s. After 1975, the MPLA, with Cuban and 
Soviet support, took power (Jackson, 1995:405). UNITA continued fighting in a civil 
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war, lasting for almost 3 decades, during which Savimbi was an insurgent (1960-
1975), rebel (1975-1992) and eventually turned warlord (1992-2002). Identity 
politics, defined by Kaldor, thus had a strong influence on Angolan politics, especially 
under Savimbi’s UNITA. UNITA had the support of the Ovimbundu; the MPLA had 
the support of the Mbundu; and the FNLA the Bakongo (Munslow, 1999:558). 
Marcum refers to this as politics based on “ethnic tripolarity”  (Munslow, 1999:558). 
 
After the struggle for independence against the Portuguese, civil war continued for 
27 years between the MPLA and UNITA. The dynamics within UNITA changed. 
UNITA’s idealism with regard to paternalism was lost in pursuit of wealth (McIntyre, 
2004:49). UNITA no longer focused on the traditional family structures it had 
created for the Ovimbundu soldiers and people, instead, UNITA focused on 
diamonds. UNITA was thus maintained “by its own internal logic of insatiable power” 
through the exploitation of diamonds (McIntyre, 2004:48). UNITA’s failure during the 
1992 elections, for Savimbi, meant that UNITA had to generate its own economic 
sustenance (McIntyre, 2004:58).  The informalization of the economy played a major 
role in this regard. Diamonds were used to 'support' Savimbi's UNITA, in its quest for 
political power. Hence, power and wealth played an increasingly greater role in the 
context of the civil war. The acquired wealth was used to finance weapons 
acquisition, while also generating further wealth for Jonas Savimbi, the warlord.   
 
The factions and their support base accounted for three-quarters of the total 
population. The FNLA failed in comparison to the MPLA and UNITA which dominated 
the political sphere. The long war in Angola, the anti-Portuguese revolutions since 
1960, the civil war since 1975, and Savimbi’s warlord activities since 1992, 
debilitated the economy. It was a classical “war economy” with rich resources in a 
poor economy. Since 1975, elite networks in the ruling MPLA, benefitted from petro-
dollar wealth, and became extremely rich; and 
 
 “...international corporations and foreign powers, for a long time sheltered from the 
direct impact of the conflict and the ethical dimension of their involvement, played 
an enabling role in the strategy of the belligerents” (Le Billon, 2001:55).  
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Foreign business, mostly resource based (oil and diamonds), placed specific rents on  
the local resource industry.  In other words, only local strongmen and business elite 
benefitted from resource contracts (Le Billon, 2001:56). UNITA had international 
contacts, as a liberation movement. However, international support ended after the 
Cold War. China also supported UNITA. Savimbi’s aim was at first purely political, 
from 1966 after he trained in China, to 1992 (Meredith, 2005:314). As an anti-
Portuguese revolutionary, his strategy was based on Maoist conceptions of guerrilla 
warfare. The civil war and Savimbi’s political dream from 1960-1974 turned into an 
international conflict, drawing support from South Africa and the Americans 
(Meredith, 2005:316). In 1975, the MPLA were successful in attaining power in 
Luanda, while UNITA retreated to the rural areas to establish a “self-sufficient” 
force.  After 1975,  UNITA acquired a conventional army. Between 1975 and 1985, 
Savimbi’s UNITA fought the Cubans and the Angolan army, while being supported by 
the Reagan administration and South Africa (Meredith, 2005:316). The foreign 
troops made it extremely difficult for Angola’s government to reach a compromise 
between the three groups. The three factions and the clashes between them, further 
sustained the conflict.  
 
Nevertheless, the MPLA, with Cuban support crushed this capacity by 1985 (Ross, 
2003: 30). Ross explains that the end of the Cold War meant that UNITA no longer 
had American external support. As a result, UNITA relied more heavily on diamond 
revenues and regional actors to support them. Throughout the 1990s, UNITA sold 
“hundreds of millions perhaps even several billion-dollar worth of diamonds”  (Ross, 
2003:31). Savimbi again turned toward guerrilla warfare, and pursued this type of 
warfare until his death. Mercenary support from a South African based firm, 
“Executive Outcomes” (EO), helped train UNITA soldiers (Parsons, 2004:52). But 
after the civil war, Savimbi turned warlord in 1992, after failing to attain power in 
the first democratic elections of Angola (Parsons, 2004:52). After refusing to accept 
the MPLA victory in the 1992 elections and the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, UNITA 
finally surrendered after Savimbi’s death in 2002 (Simon, 1998:496).  
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Bannon and Collier (2003:5) introduces the term “booty futures". This term explains 
the recent activity of rebel organizations that sell rights to mineral extraction in 
advance. Organizations often sell the resources they 'intend' on controlling, in other 
words, selling in advance that which is not theirs (Bannon & Collier, 2003:5). Hence, 
the rebel organization gains funds through selling natural resources beforehand 
should the rebellion succeed (Bannon & Collier, 2003:14). “Booty futures” operates 
only in Africa and includes a small number of actors (Ross, 2003:32). The rebel 
organization in this situation (UNITA) may be in a weaker position since it does not 
'own' the resources but receives the income. Booty futures were present in Angola, 
and have been a core catalyst in initiating and prolonging the conflict (Ross, 
2003:33).  
 
Malaquias (2000:95) states that Angola was not solely a “resource war”. The leaders 
of the MPLA and UNITA used the resources to further their political and economic 
careers, but there were deeply entrenched reasons for the ongoing conflict in 
Angola. Malaquias (2000:95) states that ethnic division among the major factions, 
dating back to pre-colonial times, have had a major impact on the continuity of war. 
Hence, class, racial and ideological differences were factors contributing to the 
animosity between the three factions. These factors also sustained Jonas Savimbi, 
the warlord.   
2.1.3. “New War” zones in Liberia & Sierra Leone 
Charles Taylor returned from the USA in 1985, creating a rebellion against the 
American supported regime of Samuel Doe in Liberia (Meredith, 2005:557). He 
gathered support from Libya in the form of weapons and training. He created his 
own militia called the NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) (Bhoke, 2006:3). The 
initial stages of his warlord activities in Sierra Leone started with the meeting of his 
future partner in crime, Foday Sankoh. 
 
In 1988, prior to being in the Sierra Leonean army, Foday Sankoh came into contact 
with radical Sierra Leoneans and left for Libya to undergo guerrilla training (Bhoke, 
2006:3). This is where he met Taylor. In 1971, Siaka Stevens had become the 
President of Sierra Leone, banning all other political parties, whereafter an internal 
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security unit was established to safeguard the President and oppress opposition 
(Issafrica, 2009). In 1985, Stevens handed over Presidency to Momoh who 
continued with the brutal dictatorship. This was a catalyst for events that were to 
come.  
 
Sankoh supported Taylor in attacking the capital of Liberia in 1989. In Liberia, Taylor 
overthrew the military government of Samuel Doe in 1990. Doe’s capture in 1990 
initiated a spark that started a civil war, lasting 13 years (Weiss, 2005:22). In return 
for Sankoh’s help, Taylor supported Sankoh and his RUF (Revolutionary United 
Front) in the invasion of Sierra Leone in 1991 (Bhoke, 2006:30).  In 1992, the new 
military government of Sierra Leone and the RUF attempted to pursue a peace 
agreement. The attempt did not last and fighting continued. In 1993, the RUF had to 
retreat into the Gola forest establishing “hit and run” bases all over the area 
(Issafrica, 2009).  
 
In 1996, elections took place in Sierra Leone in which Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah 
took power. Another peace negotiation was initiated in Sierra Leone, but peace was 
short lived. Meanwhile, Executive Outcomes and the Kamajors assisted the elected 
government. The Kamajors were local government trained soldiers. The army 
revolted a year later and the Kabbah government fled to Guinea (Issafrica, 2009). 
This is the same year (1997) that Taylor achieved Presidency in his own country of 
Liberia. The RUF wanted to seize power in the capital of Freetown, providing them 
with the access to control diamonds. The war continued in Sierra Leone till 1998.   
 
Both Sierra Leone and Liberia had abundant natural resources, diamonds in the case 
of Sierra Leone and rubber in the case of Liberia (Aning & McIntyre, 2004:67). 
Albeit, a “rubber war” did not occur in Liberia, while a diamond war did arise in 
Sierra Leone. Alluvial diamonds have been the leading resource sector in Sierra 
Leone since the 1930s (Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005:581).  This war was a typical 
“resource war”, especially focused on diamonds (Le Billon, 2005:238). "Booty 
futures" (Bannon & Collier, 2003:5) – as in Savimbi’s Angola, was also present in the 
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Liberian and Sierra Leonean examples, furthering the cause for civil conflict and 
resource wars.   
 
Through using revolutionary sentiment in Sierra Leone, Sankoh created a good base 
to attract the poor and especially young men. These men formed groups called the 
“rarray boys” and the “san-san” (Murphy, 2003:65). Similar to Taylor in Liberia, 
Sankoh promised a “meal ticket and protection”  (Meredith, 2005:563). Young, easily 
manipulated, children were recruited into the RUF. Brainwashed and drugged, the 
RUF seized Sierra Leone, with the slogan “OPERATION KILL EVERYTHING" (Hough, 
2007:12). His partner in these crimes was Charles Taylor.  
 
Maximum terror and brutality was the key tactic to make sure no one would survive 
or want to return to Sierra Leone. The civilian population was destroyed through 
looting, raping and plundering (Zack-Williams, 1999:154). Trademark tactics were 
developed, in order to infuse terror into the people. This was in the form of chopping 
off hands with machetes (Lwanda, 2003:23).  
 
Manipulation, drugs and alcohol were also used to hype up the soldiers, in order to 
impose maximum terror. Children with AK47's were used to do the 'dirty' work, 
because they were young, easily influenced and manipulated. The soldiers were 
drugged into a “blur” (Zack-Williams, 1999:154).  Over a period of 11 years, 50 000 
died, 20 000 were mutilated and more than ¾ of the population were displaced 
(Meredith, 2005:572).  
 
Taylor was concerned with the wealth of the neighbouring diamond rich Sierra 
Leone. The diamond rich Kono region was the target (Thusi & Meek, 2003:30). To a 
greater degree, fear and intimidation played a more prominent role in Taylor’s 
support base. The criminal case against Taylor supports this point (Bhoke, 2006:1). 
Although the civil war between the Krahn and NPFL created hardships in Liberia the 
RUF’s aim was to overthrow the 24 year rule of President Momoh’s government, and 
take control of their diamond assets as well as the surrounding diamond mines 
(Aning & McIntyre, 2004:69).  
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As mentioned, Taylor was first an insurgent in Liberia, where he seized power, but 
turned a warlord in Sierra Leone. Taylor seized the ‘opportunity’ as a middle man 
between the diamond mines operated by the RUF in Sierra Leone, and the 
international diamond firms. Through international contacts, and as a contestant in 
the war economy in Sierra Leone, Taylor gathered great wealth and support.  
 
A war economy in Sierra Leone based on diamonds, operating through Liberia, was 
thus created. In both countries, the state ceased to function, with only a few elite 
(“warlords”) controlling the bulk of wealth in both nations. The state could no longer 
protect its citizens, creating grievance among the populations of both Sierra Leone 
and Liberia. Taylor acquired political power through fear and intimidation in Liberia. 
In Sierra Leone, brutality was key to controlling the aggrieved population, including 
child soldiers. This was essential in order to keep control of the diamond mines and 
hush any opposition.   
 
Taylor was in partnership with Foday Sankoh and his rebel movement, the RUF since 
1991 (Reno, 1995:112). The RUF used revolutionary sentiments to gain support for 
its illegal diamond smuggling activities. Without international networking and 
support, the war could not have continued as long as it did.  
 
The two civil wars in Liberia, the first civil war (1990-1997) and the second civil war 
(1997-2003) ended with Charles Taylor’s exile to Nigeria in 2003 (Meredith, 
2005:573). Only after 2000, the RUF (in Sierra Leone) started to disarm and in 2004 
the DDR (Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration) program was officially 
declared over (Issafrica, 2009).  
 
The natural resources in Sierra Leone and Liberia were therefore used to the 
economic benefit of warlords and rulers in these weak states. In this way, these 
actors have fuelled civil conflict, which could have been settled otherwise (Weiss, 
2005:10). The informal trading of diamonds allegedly enriched other militant groups 
such as Al Qaeda (Weiss, 2005:10). Diamonds presented a non-traceable liquid 
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asset (Weiss, 2005:10). Diamonds were easily smuggled and have financed not only 
marginal leaders in West Africa, but also played an intricate role in the greater 
picture of global networking and military deals (Weiss, 2005:10).  
 
2.2. Actors in “New War” zones   
2.2.1. What the authors are saying  
The end of the Cold War, created two regional conflict zones within Africa, one in 
West Africa and one in East Africa (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:2). The first conflict zone, 
the western zone, included states such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. This zone was 
the result of conflicts surrounding the Mano River basin.  
 
The second conflict zone, the eastern zone, was created with the fall of Mobutu’s 
rule in Zaire, creating the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This conflict drew in a 
number of surrounding nations, namely, Angola, Namibia, Uganda and Zimbabwe, 
among others (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:2).  
 
The end of the Cold War saw a quick emergence of armed insurgents evolving out of 
the “international geopolitical reorganization, the crises of the neopatrimonial state, 
and the emergence of two fully developed conflict zones” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:2).  
Christopher Clapham (1998) in Bøås and Dunn (2007:3) suggests that there are four 
categories of insurgents in Africa, “liberation insurgencies, separatist insurgencies, 
reform insurgencies, and warlord insurgencies”. Taylor and Sankoh belong to the 
“warlord insurgency” category while Savimbi firstly belongs to the “liberation 
insurgency” and secondly to the “warlord insurgency”. Nevertheless, Bøås and Dunn 
(2007:4) argue that African insurgencies “are best understood as rational responses 
to the composition of African states and their polities”.  
 
Kaldor (2006:95) refers to the new war economy in the context of “globalized wars”. 
Unlike the total wars of the 20th century, new wars involve the fragmentation and 
decentralization of the state. Participation in new wars is low relative to the 
population, because of the lack of pay (Kaldor, 2006:95). The state’s domestic 
production stagnates resulting in the warring parties becoming dependent on 
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external support. The state fails to sustain physical coercion over the territory, 
eventually losing its ability to collect taxes. The weakening revenue base follows into 
a vicious cycle of corruption and personalistic rule (Kaldor, 2006:97). In this 
atmosphere of illegitimacy of the state, private agencies are employed which often 
result in tax evasion. New actors evolve out of this environment, claiming “protection 
money” (Kaldor, 2006:97). In sum, a vicious cycle of “loss of revenue and 
legitimacy, growing disorder, and military fragmentation” create the context in which 
new wars take place (Kaldor, 2006:97). This is strongly accompanied by the 
“privatization of violence” (Kaldor, 2006:97).  
 
Nitzschke and Studdard (2005:223) state that certain groups in civil war engage in 
activities that sustain the conflict.  Kaldor identifies five types of fighting units that 
are present within a new war context; “regular armed forces, paramilitary groups, 
self-defense units, foreign mercenaries and regular foreign troops under 
international auspices” (Kaldor, 2006:97).   
 
Soldiers are often unpaid and untrained, leading to soldiers seeking other ‘unsavory’ 
means of making a living (Kaldor, 2006:98). This contributes to the cycle of ill 
discipline and the breakdown of the military hierarchy, often leading to commanders 
acting as local warlords. Kaldor (2006:98) states that “regular armed forces lose 
their character as the legitimate bearers of arms and become increasingly difficult to 
distinguish from private paramilitary groups”.  
 
The “paramilitary group” includes independent men fighting for and around one 
leader.  The group can include ex-soldiers, criminals or whole groups of breakaway 
soldiers (Kaldor, 2006:99).  Underemployed men are often recruited and in some 
cases men are released from jail for the purpose of fighting in these units (Kaldor, 
2006:99). Formal military uniforms are uncommon; however, they often wear 
distinctive clothing such as Ray-Ban sunglasses and Adidas shoes (Kaldor, 2006:99). 
These groups are the most common in the new war context. Paramilitary groups are 
often associated with an extremist party or political faction (Kaldor, 2006:98). These 
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groups are often established by governments “to distance themselves from the more 
extreme manifestations of violence” (Kaldor, 2006:98). 
 
Regular foreign troops have also made an appearance in new wars. The groups 
usually operate under the auspices of Intergovernmental organisations such as UN, 
NATO and ECOMOG (Kaldor, 2006:101). These groups are often not directly involved 
in the war; however, their presence is vital. In the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
example, ECOMOG troops were involved in the fighting after taking over from 
“Executive Outcomes”.  
 
In sum Kaldor states that the above mentioned fighting units lack “hierarchy, order 
and vertical command” in comparison to guerrilla warfare (Kaldor, 2006:101). These 
units appear to be armies; however, they are often breakaway units of the military. 
The units rarely use heavy weapons. Instead “light weapons” in the form of “rifles, 
machine guns, hand-grenades and short range rockets” are used because of their 
manoeuvrability (Kaldor, 2006:102). In conclusion, Kaldor (2006:102) states that the 
end of the Cold War increased the availability of surplus weapons. In other words, 
the new wars can be seen as a form of “military waste disposal”, where unwanted 
and surplus weaponry are utilized by the new units (Kaldor, 2006:102). This was 
specifically evident in Angola, after the Cold War. 
 
Reno (1997:165) focuses on commercial alliances and the impact that these 
networks have on the weak African state. The elements that are included in Reno’s 
(1997) commercial alliances are the rulers of the weak states, foreign firms and 
creditors. The post-Cold War era meant that rulers, or weak states, had to find new 
ways of funding through the use of external support (Reno, 1997:165). During the 
Cold War, external assistance aided the rulers of the weak states to “manage 
domestic threats” (Reno, 1997:166). Weak state rulers intentionally sabotaged their 
own bureaucracies in order to receive external aid and deny local rivalries. External 
support furthered patron-client relationships.  
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Creditors play an important role in commercial alliances that has a continual 
presence in Africa. Africa has to attract Foreign Direct Investment according to the 
creditor’s prescription. African states have to obey creditors demands in order to 
provide further opportunities for clients to “generate foreign exchange while 
continuing to make loan payments” (Reno, 1997:168). Creditors use this argument 
to impose further conditions on loans and aid. Nevertheless, the failure to 
accommodate the ‘rules’ are not the main reason for the lack of investment, and 
economic decline, in Africa. Patron-client relationships pose a major threat to the 
investment climate. Reno (1997:169) states that “Even reform-minded rulers find it 
difficult to force these strongmen to pay their bills to the state”. A result is the 
accumulation of more debt. A cycle develops, Reno (1997:169) explains;  
 
“Creditors thus become increasingly tied to the survival of weak states’ rulers against 
the threatening power of old Cold War patronage networks. The weak state ruler 
can exploit his internal vulnerability, presenting himself as most worthy of outside 
support against his anti-reform rivals lodged in the state-bureaucracy”.  
 
Old Cold War patronage networks are therefore responsible for the ongoing debt 
and the policy failure within the African state.   
 
Mercenary firms, and PMCs, often act as a stable mechanism in weak states. In the 
example of the South African mercenary firm “Executive Outcomes”, involved in 
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola, stability was the outcome. This satisfies the 
creditors. In weak states with weak institutions “foreign firms are best able to 
exercise effective control over commerce and revenues” (Reno, 1997:183). The 
presence of foreign firms helps discipline local strongmen and brings resources 
under “exclusive regime control” (Reno, 1997:183). There were no mercenaries in 
any of the above, only PMCs.  
 
Similar to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Reno (2006:26) states that “greed and 
opportunity” play an important role in the motivation of actors to fight. Furthermore, 
wars that occur away from central economic and political centres are considered to 
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be in a special category of conflict. Pre-war patronage networks are one of the main 
catalysts causing conflict in Africa. These networks create major obstacles in building 
“mass protest movements” (Reno, 2006:26). The rent-seeking economies and close 
connections to criminal networks are stated to be the main reasons for predation but 
not predatory conflict (Reno, 2006:26). Reno (2006:26) thus argues that the main 
features of predatory conflict are corruption within a patronage based system, in 
which rulers have dispersed their coercion over the state, and violently oppose any 
form of opposition.   
 
Armed youths are a key characteristic of collapsing states (Reno, 2006:27). The 
youth often serve the interest of the elite. They try and enforce their presence 
through the exploitation of the existing political structures, furthermore, enforcing 
their presence in a social system from which they were excluded (Reno, 2006:26).  
There exists a close relationship between local elites, pre-conflict rulers and 
predatory behaviour among armed groups prior to conflict within a nation (Reno, 
2006:27). Hence, elites who were excluded from previous civil wars and conflicts are 
less likely to create violent armed groups in an upcoming conflict. Ignoring 
community demands becomes easier with the influx of “non-indigenous fighters, 
foreign military intervention, charitable aid, or commercial networks” (Reno, 
2006:28). This is because these actors take over the civil role of the state. This 
further results in a ‘shadow’ state, controlled by warlords.  
2.2.2. History of warlordism  
Warlordism became prominent within China through a series of civil wars after the 
collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Local and provincial rulers seized control over 
their own territory. This “warlord period” occurred between 1911 and 1937, which 
created considerable change within China (Mackinlay, 2000:1). Decentralisation 
occurred during this period, transferring power from the centre to the provincial 
level. Mackinlay (2000:2) argues that China’s 20th century warlord began their career 
as “provincial military commanders”. The Qing dynasty could not retain control over 
their military. They believed that a “dispersal of interest” would stop a widespread 
military revolution that may provide the provincial rulers with more time and power, 
to attain influence. Hence, the provincial leaders created an empire for themselves.  
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Chinese society became a place of looting and plundering. War and poverty forced 
peasants to join the criminal bands. For the poor, the military provided protection, 
status and income. Mackinlay (2000:2) states that “guns” showed power within 
society. It provided Chinese men with status and power. During this time of 
plundering and vandalism, much of China’s social and cultural heritage was 
destroyed. 
 
Historical Chinese analysts justified these actions through arguing that the members 
were of a lower class. They argued that the poor’s “intellect” was inferior and 
therefore they were oblivious to the atrocities committed. Lary in Mackinlay (2000:2) 
argues that the brutality shown within Chinese military derives from a historical 
cause. The degrading historical relationship between soldier and officer, through 
continuous beating, created the indifference within the army culture. In other words: 
 
“The Chinese military world of the warlord was too new and too fragmented to have 
established formal standards of behaviour. Soldiers learned how to behave in an ad 
hoc fashion. They became predatory towards the civilian world, not as a matter of 
policy, but in imitation of the way their commanders treated them...” (Mackinlay, 
2000:2) 
 
Mackinlay (2000:2) distinguishes between the warlord and the insurgent in China’s 
civil war. The warlord already attained support because of his military past, while 
Mao Zedong, the insurgent, had to gain popular support from different groups in 
order to be successful. Therefore, Mao’s soldiers had to be cautious while 
campaigning for support. The warlord, on the other hand, did not change his terror 
tactics. His focus was purely on the war economy and not the support of the people. 
The insurgent wants to seize national power, while the warlord only wants to retain 
local control.  
 
Similar to the rise of warlords in China, Liberia and Angola also first experienced a 
weak or collapsing state. This weak state gave way to an “opportunity” for rebellion, 
through the availability of resources. In Sierra Leone it was diamonds and in Angola 
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it was diamonds and ivory. Although Angola is oil rich, oil was never a commodity 
within the control of warlords, only petro-dollar corruption existed among the state 
elite.  
 
Taylor and Savimbi created ‘empires’ for themselves, similar to the Chinese warlord. 
Taylor created a “Greater Liberia’” where his forces controlled “significant portions of 
Old Liberia and at times, the eastern periphery of Sierra Leone” (Reno, 1995:112). 
Savimbi controlled the highlands of the Ovimbundu land. Both Savimbi and Taylor 
therefore occupied a certain area which can be seen as “quasi-states” or 
“insurgencies” (Clapham, 1998:150). These insurgencies scavenge on illegal activity 
creating any means of economic gain. Insurgencies not only engage in shadow 
economic activities but also in international transactions (Clapham, 1998:151). 
Angola and Sierra Leone are classic examples of regionalised insurgencies operating 
internationally without international recognition of ‘statehood’. In the NPFL example 
under Taylor, his creation and occupation of Greater Liberia established him as an 
international business man; 
 
“…the NPFL entered into concession agreements with major international companies, 
for the export of iron ore, rubber, and tropical timber, royalties on which were paid 
to the NPFL” (Clapham, 1998:151).  
 
In Angola, UNITA worked through similar tactics, only operating through shady 
middlemen, often with South African firms (Clapham, 1998:151). Savimbi operated 
through and from the Cuango Valley, near his capital Jamba in the south-east 
(Meredith, 2005:314). Parallel to the Chinese situation, the gangs or special units 
used force and violence to control the aggrieved population. In accordance with 
Maoism, UNITA provided the population with safety, food and an identity. However, 
through civil war and brutality, Sankoh and Taylor had a continuous flow of recruits 
for their special units. Savimbi was therefore a warlord with a difference, avoiding 
brutality and relying on loyalty. Nevertheless, as a warlord he relied on patronage.  
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The brutality in the initiation shown to the soldiers within the NPFL, resulted in the 
soldiers using that same brutality toward the civilian population. These were similar 
tactics that the commander used toward the soldier within Chinese armies. The 
soldier separated himself from society and civilian life through brutality and force.  
In line with Kaldor’s view on “new wars”, Mackinlay (2000) states that the new kind 
of warlord manifested himself after the Cold War to adapt to the changing 
international environment. The absence of interest from Russia and the USA had 
grave effects on Africa in particular. This absence created a vacuum of power, when 
this power gap was not filled, many African states collapsed into extreme poverty 
and broken bureaucracies. 
 
It was in this area filled with poverty and weak states that the new warlord made his 
appearance; 
 
“The 1990 warlord was responding to a new field of global pressures, opportunities 
and stresses. Broadly speaking, his traditionally negative role in society remained 
largely unchanged, he was still the hyena of the conflict zone, lacking courage or the 
long term commitment to confront the strong and, instead preying off the weak and 
sickly, ensuring his survival by living within a territory that he could secure in a 
military sense. But in his new environment, he could no longer ignore the attractions 
of global compression and its tendency to reach into the sanctuary of his territory” 
(Mackinlay, 2000:3).  
 
A highlighted characteristic of the new conflict zone was the increased involvement 
of international emergency relief and long term development programmes 
(Mackinlay, 2000:4). Warlords did not respect international agencies but often did 
not stop relief from entering. Warlords, in the horn of Africa, organized some of their 
sub groups to “interface” with the aid, including the Red Cross and the UN 
(Mackinlay, 2000:4). In other words, the warlord had now involved the agencies in 
the problem instead of the solution. For example, for the purpose of patronage, by 
stealing food aid and redistributing it to supporters.  
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Warlord military, unlike the Chinese example where European tactics of warfare was 
adapted, evolved into an unorganized form of military. Post Cold War forces do not 
have “uniformly developed warfare capabilities” (Mackinlay, 2000:4). New warlords 
and their combat are largely symbolic and frightening. A warlord would often not 
engage in combat, because of the mutual recognition of territory.  However Taylor’s 
campaign against ECOMOG troops in Liberia proved that, in some cases, “warlords 
were capable of concerted military action against intervention forces” (Mackinlay, 
2000:4).  
 
One striking similarity between the new warlord and the Chinese warlord is that “the 
gang culture was not vastly different” (Mackinlay, 2000:4):”The faction fighters had 
the same predatory lifestyle, preying on the weak so long as there could be no 
threat or reprisal” (Mackinlay, 2000:4). 
 
It is argued that the same brutality that manifested in China between the leaders 
and their ‘soldiers’ was present in the indoctrination of new soldiers within the NPFL 
in Liberia. In this situation the “brutality of their superiors licensed the young 
recruits’ own brutality towards civilians” (Mackinlay, 2000:4). The process of 
indoctrination expected of soldiers to deny their own families and commit atrocities. 
Prospective soldiers had to change their names and adopt new warrior names. This 
resulted in more effective and less sensitive soldiers. Similar actions, rape, vandalism 
and pillage were performed by Chinese warlords and “new zone” warlords.  
 
The creation of the new warlord is therefore the result of global market changes and 
the end of the Cold War. Warlords should not be confused with insurgents. 
Insurgents have similar characteristics, however an insurgent will return to a 
“political endgame in which he will have to submit himself to the electorate” 
(Mackinlay, 2000:5). The main motivation of a warlord remains the war economy.  
2.3. Assessment 
Kaldor (2006) has highlighted a number of actors in “globalized wars”. Reno (1995) 
argues that politics in Africa does not comply with regular formal rules but works 
through informal non-bureaucratic practices. This form of politics consists of patron-
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client relationships, meaning that personalised power is central within African 
politics. Neo-patrimonialism focuses on the relationship between formal and informal 
politics. Reno (1997:2006) further emphasises the dominance of patron-based 
networks in a post-Cold War era. He focuses on the role of foreign actors within the 
African state. Collier (2004) focuses on a more economic approach toward civil war, 
emphasising the legitimacy of the state and the revolt of the rebels. Bøås and Dunn 
(2007) on the other hand, take a more holistic approach toward guerrilla 
movements, arguing that Kaldor’s and Collier’s arguments on war in Africa are too 
narrow.  
 
The case studies presented of Savimbi’s UNITA, Taylor’s NPFL and Sankoh’s RUF, 
have major similarities but are also distinctly different. Savimbi and Taylor traded in 
alluvial diamonds and occupied a certain area. In Savimbi’s case it was the Cuango 
valley (south-eastern Angola) (Meredith, 2005:314) and in Taylor and Sankoh’s 
situation it was the Kono region (Thusi & Meek, 2003:30). The difference however is 
that Taylor simply joined the bandwagon of the RUF in exploiting diamonds. Savimbi 
started focusing on exploiting diamonds to support UNITA later in his career, 
especially in the post Cold War era. He revealed that he was trading diamonds in his 
first visit to the United States in 1979 (Potgieter, 1999:260). However, after the 
failure to attain power in the 1992 elections, Savimbi’s UNITA became more 
dependent on diamond revenue. UNITA was more a war based on “ethnic” division 
and ideology than resources.   
 
Taylor was a warlord from the beginning in 1991, while Savimbi was an insurgent 
and only later became a warlord after he lost the Angolan elections in 1992 
(McIntyre, 2004:58). 
 
The post-Cold War era saw Savimbi turn into a warlord and return to the bush. He 
established a self-sufficient and sustainable UNITA in the rural areas of Angola 
(Potgieter, 1999:259). Sierra Leone was a pure resource war, with no ethnic tribal 
base supporting the RUF. In Angola, ethnicity was relevant. Zack-Williams 
(1999:148) states that the political emergencies in Sierra Leone did not “assume the 
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ethnic or religious dimensions” compared to other civil wars. The “movement”  did 
not start off as a revolutionary struggle unlike UNITA. Unlike the situation in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia, UNITA had three factions, each with its own tribal base and own 
ideology. This resulted in a civil war between the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA 
(Munslow, 1999:558).  
 
Angola felt the pressure of the end of the Cold War more than Sierra Leone and 
Liberia. This is because Angola was a major focal point of the major powers during 
the Cold War. However, old Cold War patronage networks continued to fuel the war 
economy in Angola because of the patron-client relationships established during the 
Cold War. However, the end of the Cold War did not mean an end to external 
support (Potgieter, 1999:267). Regional actors, in the form of Zaire, Congo and 
Zambia, continued their support for their chosen liberation faction (Potgieter, 
1999:265). Liberia and Sierra Leone on the other hand, were not so much 
dependent on direct external aid from the major powers. Instead, they created their 
own transnational networks, operating through informal transnational smuggling 
channels. There is thus a major difference between the civil war and liberation 
struggle in Angola compared to the resource war in Sierra Leone. The war in Angola, 
stretching over four decades, created a platform for Cold War powers to exert their 
influence and power through supporting the various factions. China, also played a 
major role in this regard. Angola was therefore a “pawn in the Cold War” (Meredith, 
2005:313). While Taylor used revenue from his rubber exploitation and support from 
Libya to support his political campaign in Liberia, his involvement in Sierra Leone 
was purely for economic reasons. 
 
Both Angola and Sierra Leone had a South African influence in the form of 
“Executive Outcomes”. In Sierra Leone, EO was hired to evacuate Freetown of rebels 
and to train the “Kamajors” (Hough, 2007:11), while in Angola; EO was hired to 
train UNITA soldiers. Also, De Beers, a South African mining giant was involved in 
both Sierra Leone and Angola (Simon, 1998:495). Angola and Sierra Leone had what 
Ross (Bannon & Collier, 2003:5) terms, “booty futures”. Various actors were involved 
36 
 
in both nations. “Localities” in the form of the “rarray boys”, the “san-san” were 
present in Sierra Leone (Murphy, 2003:65).  
 
Only Savimbi used Maoist revolutionary sentiment to gain support. His Maoist 
strategy was key in gathering support from China (Jackson, 1995:396). He built 
identity through loyalty, similar to Mao, not brutality like Sankoh and Taylor. 
However, strategy and ideology changed after the Cold War, showing that the 
Maoist ideology was a tactic to gather support from China (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:17).     
 
In Sierra Leone and Angola there was a significant decay in regular armed forces. In 
Sierra Leone, the SLA (Sierra Leonean Army) could not defend Freetown without 
outside assistance (Hough, 2007:13). While in Angola, post 1988, the government 
forces could not defend itself against UNITA. PMCs in the form of EO helped create 
stability in Angola and Sierra Leone. Foreign troops were especially introduced in 
Sierra Leone, ECOMOG and later UNAMSIL (Hough, 2007:13). In Angola, South 
African, American, Soviet and Cuban influences were present, during the liberation 
struggle and the consequential civil wars. In Sierra Leone and Angola, the quest to 
conquer the capital was the aim at that stage. In Sierra Leone it was more of an 
economic aim while in Angola Savimbi’s aim was at first purely political. But as a 
warlord, Savimbi only wanted to defend his territory and his capital, Jamba.  
 
Neither faction wanted a “multi-racial” government. Malaquias (2000:103) states 
that the organizations were “sub-national” organizations since they wanted a “pure” 
ethnic government. In the three cases presented in this chapter, there was a 
significant deterioration of the state. All these cases were characterized by greed. 
The elite and their cronies soon became dependent on the war economy. War and 
internal strife became a necessity for the elite and their special units to survive. The 
states no longer catered for their people. A state based on client-patron relationships 
replaced formal state institutions.  The population became the target for the elite in 
West Africa and their economic aims, leading to a destabilised, lawless and deprived 
civil society. This further encouraged the poor and deprived to join the special units, 
following into a vicious cycle.    
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3. Jonas Savimbi in Angola 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Portugal’s President Dr Antonio Salazar ruled over Angola and Mozambique with an 
iron fist since 1932 until Angola’s independence in the early 1970’s (Meredith, 
2005:134). Portuguese colonies were viewed as “overseas provinces” and Portugal 
enjoyed the rich natural resources and prosperity they presented (Meredith, 
2005:134). Angola became prosperous with a growing investment and industry 
sector. However, underlying this prosperity was great discontent among the Angolan 
people. Grievances mounted as Portugal did not de-colonize after WWII. Hence, an 
anti-colonial revolution was inevitable that lasted 13 years from 1961 to 1974 
(Malaquias, 2000:102).  
 
Within the context of Portuguese rule, three liberation movements were created by 
three different men, with different backgrounds. Leadership made a significant 
impact on the armed organizations (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:29): Holden Roberto in the 
north, Agostinho Neto in the central regions and Jonas Savimbi in the south.  
 
The first movement that was created was the MPLA, established in 1956 by a group 
of Angolan intellectuals mostly mesticos (mixed race) (Meredith, 2005:135). Some of 
its leaders were white, or mixed race, with links to the Angolan Communist Party. 
The MPLA became an exile organization, continually moving its headquarters from 
Paris, to Guinea and later to the Congo (Meredith, 2005:135). The leader, Agostinho 
Neto, a former medical doctor, was supported by the Soviet Union. With Soviet and 
Cuban support, the MPLA became the ruling party after Angolan independence in 
1975. Dos Santos took over the MPLA leadership, from Neto, in 1979. At that stage, 
the MPLA fought against Savimbi’s UNITA, supported by South Africa. South Africa 
withdrew in 1975, returning in 1976 only to withdraw again in 1988, after Cuito 
Cuanavale, leaving UNITA alone (Windrich, 2008:202). Savimbi continued the civil 
war after the 1992 elections, then acted as a warlord until his death in 2002.  
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UNITA was formally launched as a breakaway group from Roberto’s FNLA, in 1966 
by Jonas Savimbi (Meredith, 2005:314). It started as an Ovimbundu insurgency 
supported by China in the mid-1960’s (Malaquias, 2007:200). Savimbi, a nationalist 
leader during the war, gained a huge following because he remained with his 
guerrilla forces during the war. He could rely on the loyalty of his followers 
(Meredith, 2005:314). He was trained in China and applied Maoist principles of rural 
guerrilla warfare. Later he controlled much of the diamond mines of the north and 
eastern interior (Munslow, 1999:551). The heartlands of diamonds were Lunda Norte 
and Lunda Sul (Munslow, 1999:553). Through his guerrilla movement, Savimbi was 
able to control rural areas, enabling him to foster agricultural production for his 
soldiers to survive (Munslow, 1999:551). Half of the production of diamonds came 
from the Cuango Valley, which UNITA controlled until 1998 (Munslow, 1999:553). 
From 1981, Savimbi’s UNITA was also supported by the USA. Chester Crocker states 
in Meredith (2005:600) that; “It was difficult not to be impressed by this Angolan, 
who combined qualities of warlord, paramount chief, demagogue and statesman”. 
Savimbi spoke seven languages, three African and four European. He is stated to 
have had a “world class strategic mind” and was even invited to the White House in 
1986, heralding him as the “champion of democracy” (Meredith, 2005:601). Anstee 
states that Savimbi “exuded charisma” (Meredith, 2005:605).  
 
Other were of the opinion that Savimbi “was a ruthless dictator, with a messianic 
sense of destiny, insistent on total control and intolerant of dissent and criticism 
from anyone in his movement” (Meredith, 2005:603). Savimbi presented himself as 
an anti-communist with strong western values (Meredith, 2005:604). He cherished 
his image as a heroic guerrilla hero among western allies. However, similar to the 
MPLA, he used security apparatus to rule in fear and keep control (Meredith, 
2005:604). He utilized ideology to further his motive and action. He, allegedly,  
purged UNITA rivals and critics (Meredith, 2005:604). Savimbi’s image was damaged 
after a rumour surfaced of him killing two prominent officials. This not only dented 
his image in the west, but also damaged his reputation with the 1992 elections 
(Meredith, 2005:604).  
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Both Savimbi and Dos Santos followed a highly centralised and personalised form of 
rule (Munslow, 1999:551). The MPLA was considered “robbers” and UNITA 
“assassins” by popular street culture in Luanda, prior to the 1992 elections 
(Munslow, 1999:552). The wealth of Angola, diamonds and oil, dominated by the 
two warring factions, empowered them to be immune to outside and internal 
pressure (Munslow, 1999:552).  Although Savimbi had access to the diamonds and 
ivory, the MPLA remained in control of the oil fields in Cabinda, northern Angola. The 
international interest in Angola’s wealth probably led to the conflict continuing longer 
than it should have since many international firms, like Chevron, had invested in 
Angola since 1997 (Munslow, 1999:552). Dos Santos won and Savimbi lost the 1992 
elections. Savimbi then returned to the bush, and continued the civil war. The new 
American president, Bill Clinton, decided that since the Cold War was over, 
Washington had to recognize Luanda after 1992. Without American support, Savimbi 
became a warlord.  
3.2. Following 
Savimbi parted from Holden Roberto’s FNLA to form UNITA in 1966 (Jackson, 
1995:392). In line with Maoist training, it was a peasant-based organization, 
although Angolan whites also started to support UNITA. It remained hostile toward 
the mesticos and assimilados in the cities. UNITA’s support base remained the 
Ovimbundu in the central and southern regions, Ngangela and Chokwe (Jackson, 
1995:392). The Ovimbundu is the largest ethno-linguistic group and occupy 35-40% 
of Angola’s population, dominating the areas with the highest population density 
(Malaquias, 2000:102). According to Malaquias (2000:102) they have been regarded 
as a “nation” rather than a tribe.   
 
At the start of the civil war, UNITA had a small guerrilla army but was ideologically 
well integrated and had popular support in Ovimbunduland. Their advantage was 
that they controlled the Benguela railway through Central Angola. Firstly based in 
Zambia, UNITA’s base moved to Egypt in 1989 but returned to Angola, staying there 
till 2002 (Jackson, 1995:392).  
 
40 
 
Savimbi supposedly represented the “African” people of Angola, at least from the 
rural areas of the central and southern Angola, while the MPLA was partially 
dominated by whites and mesticos in Luanda (Meredith, 2005:603). Ironically, 
UNITA survived for long through the assistance of white minority rule in South 
Africa. For example, Savimbi’s headquarters in Jamba (south-east of Angola) had 
been protected by South African forces for 13 years (Meredith, 2005:603).    
 
With Ovimbundu support, Savimbi manipulated symbolic elements such as “tribal 
affiliation and kinship patterns”  (Malaquias, 2000:97). His home town and base in 
Bailundo, was also the historical seat of the senior Ovimbundu king. The roots went 
deep, Munslow (1999:558) states; 
 
“Ovimbundu rulers seemed to rely on the hunter imagery to support their claims to 
leadership. Moreover, members of civil society had also internalized these traditions, 
expecting their rulers to act autocratically”. 
 
In other words, in times of crisis, autocratic rule as well as the hunter-king image 
became useful (Munslow, 1999:558). Moreover, in line with Maoist principles, UNITA 
succeeded in winning the “hearts and minds” of the Ovimbundu people, mainly by 
identifying with their grievances and symbols (Potgieter, 1999:258).  
3.3. Ideology and Organization 
Although, post-independent Angola was depicted as a “resource war”, this 
categorization does not take into account the deep cultural, ideological and ethnic 
factors underlying the long civil war. Malaquias (2000:95) argues that Angola’s civil 
war was not just a resource war, but a war consisting of dominant politico-military 
forces striving for power but each with deep ethnic and ideological differences. The 
divisions between the three main nationalist groups have therefore contributed 
greatly to the ongoing war, stating that “the divisions between the nationalist groups 
were caused mainly by ethnic differences predating colonialism” (Malaquias, 
2000:95). In fact, the differences between these three factions were so severe, that 
they could not join forces against their common enemy, the Portuguese. Race and 
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class thus feature prominently as factors contributing to the war (Malaquias, 
2000:96).  
 
Ideology may be termed as a “shared belief” of a group of people. It is argued that 
these groups often ‘faked’ their ideological preference in order to gain aid or support 
from external powers. This can be seen by the “rapidity” at which many armed 
groups dropped their ideological aspirations at the end of the Cold War (Bøås & 
Dunn, 2007:17). Jonas Savimbi is a good example of this. Hence, after the Cold 
War, ideology no longer played such an important part in the guerrilla movements.  
Greed and looting became more prominent as Savimbi began to behave less like a 
revolutionary and more like a warlord. Instead these groups adopted “contemporary 
sounding generic labels” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:17), revealing the capacity of these 
movements to adapt to a changing global environment. This is best shown in the 
“pattern of alliance during the Cold War as it changed to the global connections of 
business and crime in the globalized post Cold War”  era (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:17).  
 
Savimbi’s organization of UNITA was influenced by Maoist thinking. Savimbi himself 
went for a strategic course in rural guerrilla warfare at the Nanjing Military College in 
1975, China. UNITA, first trained in China in 1966 (Malaquias, 2007:202). In 1976, 
UNITA became the only organization mentioned in the Chinese press. This served 
them well as UNITA claimed that it was following a Maoist strategy of rural guerrilla 
warfare since 1966 “”actively building base areas, relying on the broad masses, 
using Chinese army discipline regulations” (Jackson, 1995:397). This also included 
praise for Mao Zedong and the Chinese struggle as well as condemning the 
Americans, Soviets and Portuguese imperialism. Maoist ideology believed that victory 
could not be built on military strength alone but most importantly on popular support 
(Potgieter, 1999:259). Maoism thought that “people are to the army what water is to 
the fish”, implying winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population. Even as a 
warlord, post 1992, Savimbi seldom brutalized the locals. Savimbi was probably 
never as ruthless as Foday Sankoh or Charles Taylor in West Africa.  
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The Chinese press during the 1960s and the mid 1970s portrayed the struggles in 
Angola as similar to the Chinese Communist revolution; building on, 
 
“…large base areas, relying on the masses, peasants heartily supporting guerrillas, 
guerrillas growing their own crops, guerrillas using Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) discipline regulations and “speak bitterness” meetings in villages all were 
written up in Remin ribao (Peoples’ daily) and other Chinese media sources” 
(Jackson, 1995:393). 
 
After Angola’s independence in 1975, UNITA and China parted ways. Then the South 
Africans and Americans became UNITA’s major supporters. The Maoist principles of 
rural guerrilla warfare were replaced by attempts to change UNITA’s organization 
from a guerrilla army to a conventional army. This was less successful.  
 
UNITA assisted the SADF (South African Defence Force) in its invasion of Angola in 
1975, forming UNITA as a quasi-conventional force (Malaquias, 2007:220). In 1976, 
however, UNITA returned to its guerrilla tactics after losing the battle for Luanda. 
This time Savimbi was more focused on building a “sustainable state and parallel 
hierarchies into official structures” within south-east Angola (Potgieter, 1999:259). 
Parallel hierarchies became imminent within UNITA’s structures, portraying an image 
that UNITA served the people and their interest, further accumulating popular 
support. UNITA’s parallel hierarchies were thus created within the context of the 
“absence of functioning governmental administration“(Potgieter, 1999:259).  
 
By the mid 1990s, UNITA was successful in establishing a state within a state with a 
socio-economic infrastructure (Potgieter, 1999:262). Schools, health services and 
clinics were established. Students were often sent overseas to get a tertiary 
education.  
 
The education focus areas were specifically chosen in sectors that would help UNITA 
sustain itself, namely engineering, medicine and agricultural education. Farms were 
established that served as “protective hamlets” , creating safe havens in moving 
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populations out of warring zones and producing and storing food (Potgieter, 1999: 
262).  
 
3.4. Techniques 
Guerrilla movements are not a new phenomenon. Many of them have been fuelled 
by liberation movements fighting colonialism and outside powers, using Africa as a 
part of their “zero sum game” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:2). The liberation struggle, and 
later the civil war in Angola, fits this description.  According to Potgieter (1999: 255) 
there are three strategies used by insurgent groups to obtain their political goals, the 
Maoist, the Marxist-Leninist and the Cuban models. UNITA followed the Maoist 
model which focuses on “popular support, organization, environment, and self 
reliance”  (Potgieter, 1999:255).  
 
This strategy consists of several stages, the stages being interdependent. This 
includes the “political organization phase, guerrilla warfare phase, and the mobile 
warfare phase” (Potgieter, 1999:255). All three stages are discernible in UNITA’s 
history, with the “mobile phase” only practiced during the civil war when UNITA was 
actively supported by the South African Defence Force until 1988.  
 
During the first phase, political organization, groups are formed to build political 
propaganda for popular support. Guerrilla teams are organized to attack selected 
targets (Potgieter, 1999:256). Parallel hierarchies begin to form, providing social 
services that would otherwise have been provided by the government. The objective 
being to mobilize support and to show that the organization is better than the 
government, while also building self reliance (Potgieter, 1999:256). 
 
In the guerrilla phase, small guerrilla units are deployed in rural areas where 
government control is weak. The result is that the population is detached from the 
central government, providing a gap for parallel hierarchies to operate fully. The 
parallel hierarchy is core to the Maoist strategy. This is because it shows the 
weakness of the government in providing for their own citizens, implanting the rebel 
organization and displacing the government. Ideology is stressed in this phase 
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(Potgieter, 1999:256). UNITA implemented such a strategy from 1966, until South 
Africa’s first withdrawal in 1976 (Malaquias, 2007:201-202).  
 
The final phase is the conventional warfare phase, meaning mobile according to the 
Maoist strategy. This is when cities had to be encircled, something UNITA never 
achieved in Angola. Before 1988, UNITA became a conventional army with President 
Reagan’s (1981-1988) as well as South African support. After 1988, and after the 
elections of 1992, UNITA tried to capture the towns of Bailundo and Andulo, without 
success.  
 
Because of trouble supplying weapons from China via Zambia, UNITA, as an anti-
Portuguese guerrilla army,  were not well supplied in their first clash with the 
Portuguese (Potgieter, 1999:257).  As Mao’s model implied “the best source of arms 
is from the enemy” (Potgieter, 1999:257). UNITA looted the rifles that the 
Portuguese gave to the village chiefs to protect themselves. However, after careful 
rethinking of the attacks, they realized that Maoist principles were not strictly 
applied. This was a turning point in UNITA’s strategy, where they vowed to strictly 
stick to Maoist ideology and tactics, hence the saying: 
 
“We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; 
we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the 
entire people” (Potgieter, 1999:257). 
 
The two failed attacks on the Portuguese colonial power in 1966 damaged UNITA’s 
reputation. There was an upside to the embarrassing failure of the 1966 attacks. It 
spread UNITA’s reputation toward its neighbours, enabling support from Egypt and 
further support from Zambia (Potgieter, 1999:257).  
 
In 1988, with the New York Accord, South Africa and America withdrew from Angola 
(Malaquias, 2007:207). This withdrawal affected Savimbi and his UNITA severely 
and would eventually lead to its destruction. Savimbi started operating through 
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installing fear into the population, living under government control. He was now a 
typical warlord (Malaquias, 2007:208-209).  
 
3.5. External Support 
The FNLA and UNITA were supported by the United States during the Cold War 
(Malaquias, 2000:113). China supported both factions at a point and South Africa 
helped the FNLA in the fight over the capital in 1975, along with UNITA. The FNLA 
and UNITA, although different factions, were interlinked at some stages in the war, 
either through direct contact or international actors.  
 
China had a very significant role, in an ideological sense as well as acting as a 
support structure, especially with regard to UNITA. The Reagan Administration’s 
foreign policy (1981-1988) “treated all problems in the world as the result of the 
Soviet Union” while China wanted to increase Chinese prestige and influence in the 
OAU and the AAPSO (Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization) (Jackson, 1995: 
389). China wanted to be able to ‘compete’ with the Russians and the Soviet bloc 
(Jackson, 1995:389). This meant supporting the liberation movements that opposed 
the Russians. These movements were also utilized to spread pro-Chinese 
propaganda of which Savimbi was an adamant supporter.   
 
After the battle for independence in 1975 (in which the MPLA took control over the 
capital), the civil war turned into an international conflict (Meredith, 2005:315). The 
United States and South Africa were involved to keep the Soviet backed MPLA from 
gaining power. South Africa was an ally of UNITA since 1976. The SADF supported 
and retrained UNITA’s soldiers (Malaquias, 2007:220). South Africa had their own 
agenda. South Africa was able to carry out a “secret war in Angola for more than a 
decade” because of US policy and their support against Communism (Windrich, 
2008: 195). They saw Cuban and Soviet involvement as part of a conspiracy to 
dominate Southern Africa (Meredith, 2005:317). South Africa wanted a “moderate 
pro-Western” government in Luanda (Meredith, 2005:317). Angola created a stage 
for South Africa to show its anti-communist loyalty to the Americans. South Africa 
agreed to supply the FNLA and UNITA with arms and training, covering it up as 
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mercenary operations (Meredith, 2005:317). The greater South African interest had 
a spill-over effect for other actors involved, Cuba increased its troops and China had 
to rethink its policy toward Angola. This is because China supported the same 
factions as South Africa (Jackson,1995:388). Chinese forces (PLA) left in 1975, after 
the South African intervention (Jackson, 1995:408).  
 
The Americans were increasingly involved, especially after the failure of the Vietnam 
War in 1975 (Meredith, 2005:316). US policy toward UNITA was “constructive 
engagement” (Potgieter, 1999:260). This further enabled South Africa to provide for 
UNITA. America had to show the world that it had not lost its influence and power. 
One way to do this was through defeating the Soviet hold in Angola through 
focusing on the Angolan conflict. Through supporting UNITA and the FNLA, the 
Americans wanted to halt the Soviet hold on Angola, operating through the MPLA 
(Meredith, 2005:316).  
 
In 1976, the FNLA stronghold “Sao Salvador”  fell and Huambo was captured forcing 
Savimbi east (Meredith, 2005:319). A civil war continued for over two decades.  
 
By 1976, UNITA had raised $18 billion, mainly deriving from Arab, Iran and French 
interest (Potgieter, 1999:260). Financial and material support originated from 
Gabon, Senegal, Sudan, Egypt and Morocco (Potgieter, 1999:260). Nevertheless, 
South Africa was the main support pillar for UNITA. South Africa provided military 
assistance and acted as a “conduit’” for natural resources, diamonds, ivory and 
timber to the outside world (Potgieter, 1999:260). By 1979 with American and South 
African support, UNITA gained strategic control over Mavinga, Cuito Cuanavale, and 
eventually its headquarters and capital, Jamba (Malaquias, 2007:220).  The MPLA 
and Cuba could never capture Jamba (Windrich, 2008:196). This was the prelude to 
the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987/1988, which was situated en route from 
central Angola to Jamba. South Africa was supporting UNITA by the 1980s with an 
annual budget of $200 million. This derived from tax payer’s pockets in South Africa.  
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After South African withdrawal, prior to Namibian independence, American and 
Russian officials gathered to try and solve Angola’s civil strife. Months later in 1991, 
Savimbi and Dos Santos agreed to bring an end to the 16 year war (Meredith, 
2005:601). The end of the Cold War was achieved in 1991, and preparations were 
made for the 1992 democratic elections (Meredith, 2005:602).  
 
The end of the Cold War meant that UNITA, the MPLA and the FNLA no longer had 
major external lifelines, hence, new strategy had to be formulated. It can be argued 
that UNITA’s dependence on natural resources to fund the war and compensate 
their allies, had a significant role in shaping Savimbi as a warlord, post 1992. UNITA 
lost its capacity to wage conventional warfare after 1992, and used guerrilla tactics, 
thus “destabilizing large parts of rural Angola and exerting a severe regime over the 
civilians living under them” (Clover, 2002:1). This is said to have been UNITA’s 
downfall since it disrupted their relationship with the local population (Malaquias, 
2007:217). UNITA’s decision to remain stationary in order to “secure physical control 
over valuable resources “ created a shift in tactics within the organization (Bøås & 
Dunn, 2007:34). UNITA became stationary after wanting to control the diamond 
extraction industry. The SADF apparently wanted compensation from UNITA, for 
their support during the 1980s. This made UNITA more dependent on diamond 
trade, ivory and timber revenues (Windrich, 2008:196), laying the foundation for the 
making of Savimbi, the warlord.  
 
Post 1992, UNITA tried to re-establish its conventional capabilities again, without 
success. The MPLA, at this time, presented a hurdle in UNITA’s future success. The 
MPLA, was now officially recognized by Washington, and wanted Savimbi indicted as 
a “war criminal” in 1996 (Malaquias, 2007:213). UNITA’s revenue through illicit 
diamond smuggling meant that they could afford weapons and retrieve weapons 
with ease (Malaquias, 2007:216). During this time, however, UNITA deviated from 
Maoist principles of “local support in rural guerrilla warfare”. Maoist ideology, was no 
longer the core within UNITA’s structures. 
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Savimbi lost the elections in 1992 against the MPLA (Meredith, 2005:608). UNITA 
gained 32% of the seats while the MPLA gained 59% (Munslow, 1999:559). This 
was another beginning of Jonas Savimbi as a warlord. War erupted again and UNITA 
took over large parts of the Lunda region (Northeast Angola) and controlled the 
diamond mines. UNITA tried to occupy the palace in Huambo. Luanda was in 
shambles, a “wholesale butchery” (Meredith, 2005:609).   
 
“Government ninjas and armed vigilantes from the musseques hunted down UNITA 
supporters in a ‘cleansing operation’ -limpenza- intended to eliminate them from 
Luanda (Meredith, 2005:609-610).  
 
This time however, the Cold War powers were not present and there were no major 
powers involved. It was a pure struggle between individuals striving for individual 
power. The “war of the cities” lasted for two years, causing widespread destruction 
(Meredith, 2005:610).  
 
Savimbi was able to capture strategic towns throughout the 1980s (Malaquias, 
2007:220). By then the MPLA and UNITA planted millions of landmines, leaving a 
new generation of “mutilados” (Meredith, 2005:610). Savimbi, no longer supported 
by Cold War patrons, was now supported by Zaire’s President Mobutu enabling him 
to trade diamonds and arms (Meredith, 2005:611). Savimbi in his warlord phase, 
paid for himself with conflict diamonds. UNITA earned $300-500 million annually and 
this gave Savimbi great leverage. Mobutu also provided Savimbi with “end-user 
certificates for arms deals and allowed him to stockpile weapons in Zaire, in return 
for diamonds and cash” (Meredith, 2005:611). Congo and Togo supported Savimbi 
while President Eyade’ma from Togo gave Savimbi’s children a sanctuary. Flush with 
money, Savimbi focused on strengthening UNITA’s conventional capabilities 
(Malaquias, 2007:212). He aimed to capture Bailundo (the seat of the Ovimbundu) 
and the town of Andulo (his birthplace). But he overestimated his power, and failed.  
By 1994, Savimbi’s hold on his territory disintegrated. UNITA lost ground against the 
newly formed and organized government forces. 
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In 1997, after Mobutu’s fall, UNITA shifted its entry-port to Congo-Brazzaville. Soon 
afterward President Lissouba of Congo was faced with the same situation as Mobutu 
by Denis Sassou-Nguesso with the help of the FAA.  
 
In March 1997, 50% of Angola’s territory was claimed to still be under UNITA rule, 
while 80% of the population was living in government-held areas (Simon, 
1998:497). This compelled Savimbi to move forward with the Lusaka Protocol in 
1998 (Simon, 1998:496). Angolan government forces had already supported Laurent 
Kabila’s campaign against Mobutu. The aim of the government was to cut off 
Savimbi’s base in Zaire (Simon, 1998:496). Arms were still delivered through a 
network of dealers by Mobutu in the Congo to UNITA (Juma, 2007:1). After Mobutu, 
only President Lissouba from Congo-Brazzaville supported UNITA (Simon, 1998:496).  
 
After 1992, sanctions were imposed on UNITA, banning international travel and 
closing their offices abroad (Meredith, 2005:612). In 1998, the Security Council 
banned the purchase of Angolan diamonds “blood diamond” without official 
certificates (Meredith, 2005:612). Splits in UNITA occurred (Munslow, 1999:559). 
UNITA’s bank accounts were frozen. But the collapse of the Mobutu regime was 
fateful to the existence of UNITA.  
 
Savimbi tried to be victorious one more time (Meredith, 2005:612). Dos Santos 
declared that if Savimbi did not comply with the Protocol, war would be the only 
solution. The Lusaka Protocol broke down in 1998, while the international 
community blamed Savimbi for his lack of responsiveness in a pursuit of peace 
(Munslow, 1999:555). According to Munslow (1999:556) the Protocol had a major 
flaw. It was more concerned with international involvement and focused on the 
latter’s presence to make it work, rather than gaining a real commitment from 
UNITA (Munslow, 1999:556). In 1998, the UN declared that UNITA had demobilized, 
however, soon after, UNITA mobilized its soldiers again in the rural areas (Munslow, 
1999:556). Savimbi regrouped and moved toward Zaire, before it became the DRC 
(Simon, 1998:496). 
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Another war erupted and lasted for three years (Meredith, 2005:612). Savimbi 
eventually lost control over Bailundo and moved further east to Moxico. The 
government changed its tactics to “scorch earth”, meaning that rural populations 
were forcibly removed and their crops were burned (Meredith, 2005:613). Savimbi 
was eventually trapped and killed in 2002, near the Zambian border. UNITA 
eventually pursued peace (Clover, 2002:1).  
3.6. Assessment 
Jonas Savimbi initially started as an insurgent in the anti-Portuguese revolution, 
leading UNITA, as a liberation movement against the colonial power. Then the 
insurgent turned rebel during the civil war that lasted from 1974-1992. Savimbi 
never joined a government army. He was always loyal to his guerrilla movement 
throughout the revolution and civil war, remaining with them in the bush. 
 
Savimbi’s failure in the 1992 elections resulted in him recommitting to warfare, 
where he acted as a typical warlord. He was a local strongman and looted and 
traded in ivory and diamonds. In the absence of Chinese, South African and 
American support, his lifeline was looting.  
 
Unlike revolutionaries, warlords want to only control “rich” areas, where there is 
profit and support. Revolutionaries want to control the whole of the state. Unlike a 
typical warlord, Savimbi was not nearly as brutal in his tactics. Instead he relied for 
long on Maoist principles and built UNITA on the importance of local popular 
support. However, post 1992, UNITA’s relationship with the local population did take 
strain. This was because of UNITA’s trade in diamonds and ivory and relying more 
on coercion and less on loyalty, for military survival.  
 
As a warlord, the greed factor must have played a role because Savimbi gained 
great profit through the looting and trading of Angola’s diamonds. This profit was 
used to sustain UNITA and to ‘pay back’ some of UNITA’s allies that helped them 
during the civil war. He utilized Zambia and Zaire as trading posts and collaborated 
with De Beers in trading illicit diamonds. Diamond smuggling routes in Angola were 
diverse (Dietrich, 2000:317). UNITA’s diamond export capacity depended upon 
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interaction with foreign dealers. Hence, Savimbi had to have a good business sense 
in order to make profit. But little was invested in development, as mush had to line 
the pockets of illicit dealers, and of course, the acquisition of arms.  
 
UNITA had access to the international market and represented one of the world’s 
largest diamond smuggling operations, attracting legitimate diamantaires and 
criminal elements alike (Dietrich, 2000:318). He also utilised “booty futures”. The 
routes through which diamonds were smuggled created a link between the product 
and the buyer. UNITA’s primary allies in West Africa were Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso 
and Togo, but there existed numerous other secretive routes (Dietrich, 2000:321). 
 
With Savimbi’s assassination in 2002, UNITA became “headless” (Malaquias, 
2007:218). UNITA was no longer a rebel movement or an insurgency. Similar to 
other warlord outfits in Africa, the removal of UNITA’s leadership meant the end of 
war. The Angolan war ended “with the quietest of whimpers” (Malaquias, 2007:218).  
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4. Taylor as an insurgent in Liberia and as a warlord in Sierra Leone. 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
This chapter focuses on Charles Taylor (former president of Liberia), as a warlord in 
Sierra Leone, and in addition how he extended his criminal activities into the 
diamond trade of Sierra Leone. The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, more than 
others in Africa, were characterized by widespread violence and “gross abuse of 
human rights” (Aning & McIntyre, 2004:69). Taylor was leader of the NPFL that 
toppled Samuel Doe in 1990. It is argued that the origin of the extreme violence was 
a result of the involvement of the “lumpen” youth (Aning & McIntyre, 2004:72). 
“Lumpen youths” were considered to be the youth from the lowest socio-economic 
margin in Sierra Leone and Liberia. They were often associated with street life, 
violence and crime. Sierra Leone and Liberia set the stage for the warlord activities 
that Sankoh (leader of the RUF in Sierra Leone), but especially Taylor, committed 
through their respective movements. The Special Court of Sierra Leone was created 
in 2004 for the human rights atrocities committed by the NPFL-RUF alliance against 
civilians (Malan, 2003:142). This civil war therefore “constituted grave breaches of 
international humanitarian law” (Malan, 2003:142). Murphy (2003:68) states;  
 
“Warlord politics represents a new and harsher form of patrimonial politics, now 
based on the military capture and domination of economically valuable human and 
natural resources of the country”. 
 
The networks that Taylor accumulated through Sankoh, in Sierra Leone, enabled him 
to control informal diamond markets and “clandestine economic operations”  
(Murphy, 2003:68). The corruption that infiltrated society was built on a patronage 
system, exploiting the unemployed youth and their poor socio-economic conditions, 
many of whom were recruited as followers (Murphy, 2003:69). Charles Taylor’s 
history begins in Liberia.  
 
Historically, Liberia has been the victim of client-patron politics. Liberia was formed 
by the descendants of three hundred black settler families from America in 1847 
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(Weiss, 2005:22). It was a family affair, with the Barclays, the Kings, or the Tubman 
family ruling over Liberia as the ruling elite (Weiss, 2005:22). The last of them was 
William Tolbert who was toppled by Sergeant Samuel Doe in a coup in 1980 (Weiss, 
2005:22). These Americo-Liberian elites had a different class identity, disconnected 
from the locals whose language they hardly spoke. It is argued that Liberia’s civil 
war was deeply entrenched in its history and its American influence in the 18th 
century. Thus the civil war “can best be understood as a violent expression of the 
tendencies, organization, and attitudes toward identity, society, and class that have 
underpinned Liberia since its formation as a state” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:12). To be 
sure, there were two civil wars lasting 14 years (Weiss, 2005:23), the first from 
1989-1996 and the second from 1999-2003. In 2003, Taylor abdicated.  
 
The Americo-Liberians were the elite of Liberia and regarded their American heritage 
as unique. They constructed a settler-type system in which they ruled with a heavy 
hand over the indigenous population, regarding them as a “lower” race. Wealth was 
therefore concentrated in the hands of the privileged few, the Americo-Liberians. 
Although they spoke English, and were an upper class, they never claimed an ethnic 
identity. They were also known as creoles.  
 
At the height of African independence, during the 1960s, Liberia remained very 
much under elitist rule with foreign surnames such as Tubman and Tolbert. Taylor 
fits this picture. Only Liberian property owners had the right to vote, leaving out the 
majority of the population (Issafrica, 2002). The 1970s brought about little change, 
while Liberia remained an “oligarchic democracy” (Issafrica, 2002).  
 
William Tolbert ruled till 1980, the last of the Americo-Liberian presidents. He was 
the first President, after independence, to allow an opposition party to enter the 
Liberian political arena (the Progressive Alliance of Liberia). However, with the 
economic development of the 1970s, personal enrichment was still the main aim of 
the elite (Issafrica, 2002). 
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Rubber, initially, brought in the main revenue for the ruling class. Firestone launched 
investment in Liberia, catering for American demand (Meredith, 2005:547). After 
1979, an uprising occurred as a result of the rising price of rice. Tolbert ordered to 
open fire on the demonstrators, killing dozens (Dennis, 2006:3). At that time, the 
state was weak with law and order disintegrating, creating a space for the military to 
step in. 
 
In 1980, sergeant Samuel Doe (not of American descent), along with dissident 
soldiers, overthrew the Tolbert regime (Issafrica, 2002). His tribe, the Krahn, would 
play a core role in the future of Liberian politics. This was not necessarily a 
revolution but simply a rebellion of grievances over “poor living conditions in army 
barracks” , while state and society deteriorated (Meredith, 2005:549).  
 
In next-door Sierra Leone, Joseph Momoh took over civilian power in the one party 
state from Siaka Stevens. It was during Momoh’s rule (1985-1992) that Foday 
Sankoh and his RUF, assisted by Charles Taylor, began with their uprising. Diamonds 
were controlled by private entrepreneurs and the government received little profit. 
This in turn created protest among civil servants receiving no or little income from 
the government. Disenfranchised men and unemployed youths in the form of the 
“rarray boys” evolved, looting and vandalizing Freetown in the name of the RUF 
(Hough, 2007:10).  
 
In Liberia, Americo-Liberians, and their business connections, remained in place, 
despite Doe’s promises of a fairer country. Doe’s regime was an example of 
centralized rule that exploited the state and its resources to the bone, while 
corruption reigned: “Murder, rape, and other kinds of human rights abuses became 
the accepted order” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:26). The result of this was that people 
started looking for answers in magic and secret societies in Liberia. The conflict 
increasingly started to revolve around ethnicity and had a grave effect on the 
continuing civil war (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:26). By the late 1980s, Doe was vulnerable 
to opposition, and as indicated above, was eventually overthrown by Charles Taylor 
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and his NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia). Charles Taylor was also an 
Americo-Liberian and considered himself part of the elite.  
 
The Liberian civil war (1989-2003) soon spread into neighbouring Sierra Leone. 
Taylor utilized Liberian territory to support Sankoh’s RUF to invade Sierra Leone in 
1991. Bad governance and deteriorating economic conditions, as a consequence of 
resource extraction, remained a characteristic of Sierra Leonean politics (McIntyre, 
2002:2). Diamonds, for over three decades, had provided the government in 
Freetown with “more than half of its revenue” (Meredith, 2005:561).  
 
Hence, Charles Taylor had a dual role in West Africa: President of Liberia while being 
warlord in Sierra Leone. He pursued diamonds in Sierra Leone, seldom controlled by 
the weak state. Sierra Leonean diamonds had been under the control of “warlords, 
foreign traders and mercenaries” (Malan & Meek, 2003:127). Included in this 
network were Lebanese, Mandinka (or Mandingo) and Liberian traders. The 
Mandinka people are one of the largest tribes in West Africa, however, they do not 
form the largest ethnic group in any one country (except Gambia).  
 
While President in Liberia, Taylor focused on precious resources such as gold, 
diamonds, timber and rubber. At the height of the Liberian civil war (1989-2003), 
Taylor controlled ninety percent of the country, while the actual President, Doe 
controlled only Monrovia, the capital (Murphy, 2003:71). Taylor, even though he was 
not yet the President (only became President in 1997), he was the main economic 
actor, having trade relations with major multinational corporations. He operated 
through extensive commercial ties, acting as the sovereign head of state, even 
though he wasn’t. At one point he was getting paid “$10 million a month for selling 
stockpiled iron ore to a consortium of European Community, United States and 
Japan” (Murphy, 2003:71). This in turn enabled Taylor to fund his war activities 
during the early nineties in next door Sierra Leone. Even before the civil war started 
in Sierra Leone, diamonds were the main prize and fuelled patronage politics. 
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Taylor wanted revenge. He was aggrieved at ECOMOG because they inhibited his 
taking power of the Liberian capital during the Liberian civil war, after Doe was killed 
in 1990. Also, Taylor was angry at Sierra Leone for its double role “as peacemaker 
while at the same time allowing ECOMOG to use its airport to bomb territories 
controlled by Taylor’s faction” (Zack-Williams, 1999:147). He wanted to do “a 
RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance Movement) on Sierra Leone” (Zack-
Williams, 1999:147). At that stage, Taylor the warlord was mainly interested in the 
alluvial diamond fields of the Kono region of neighbouring Sierra Leone. During this 
time he joined with Sankoh to make more money in Sierra Leone.   
4.2. Leadership 
Taylor was regarded by his peers and foreign traders as elegant and magnetic 
(Olonisakin, 2008:72). He considered himself a Liberian elite and an intellectual. 
Although he was born in 1948 in an Americo-Liberian settlement, Arlington in 
Monrovia, he became an exile. He was educated in Boston, USA where he attained a 
degree in Economics; he stayed there for almost nine years and then later returned 
to Liberia where he got a job as “head of the General Services Agency” in Doe’s 
government, which lasted from 1980-1990 (Dennis, 2006:10). He soon fell out of 
favour because of his embezzlement activities. He fled to the USA where he was 
sentenced, and went to prison for sixteen months. He escaped through the use of 
bribery in 1985 to West Africa where he drifted around for a year gaining support to 
overthrow Doe as President in 1990. Although Taylor achieved Presidency, through 
elections in 1997, he was unable to make the shift from a rebel to a “statesman” 
(Adebajo, 2002:236): 
 
“Having himself led an ultimately successful rebellion into Liberia based on the 
exploitation of ethnic grievances, and having witnessed Doe’s grisly end, Taylor is 
deeply aware of his own vulnerability in Liberia’s political cesspit” (Adebajo, 
2002:236).  
 
Taylor’s partner in crime was Foday Sankoh, who led the RUF. Sankoh was not an 
intellectual. Taylor and Sankoh met in a training camp in Libya. Sankoh had spent 
seven years in prison with charges against him for attempting a coup against Siaka 
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Stevens in 1971 (Little, 2007:284). He had worked as a photographer before going 
to Libya. The RUF had a vaguely populist agenda. They claimed to be fighting 
against the corrupt dictatorship of Stevens and Momoh who ruled over Sierra 
Leone’s resources. Hence, the RUF had to overthrow the Momoh regime in order to 
gain territory over the diamond fields in the Kono region (Meredith, 2005:563). They 
succeeded in capturing parts of Sierra Leone, and Sankoh was declared “governor of 
Sierra Leone” (Meredith, 2005:563). But this was just propaganda as Momoh was 
nominally in charge, and captain Valentine Strasser took over in a coup in 1992 
(Cornwell, 1998:1). It was he who contracted PMCs to defend the capital, Freetown 
from being captured by RUF rebels in 1995.  
 
In many ways Taylor and Sankoh shared a similar history. They were both dissidents 
in West Africa, gathering support from Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi (Olonisakin, 
2008:72). They met in Ghana in 1987 and they received training at the Benghazi 
camp in Libya. Their common purpose: to remove their governments from power 
and to exploit their region. These two factors combined the two in an alliance.  
 
Their alliance was beneficial to both of them, but Taylor’s ambitions went further 
than Liberia’s borders (Olonisakin, 2008:73). He wanted to dominate the Mano River 
Basin. If the RUF could capture Freetown, and Sankoh attain power in Sierra Leone 
(which he never did), it would aid Taylor in achieving his goal that is to profit from 
diamonds next door (Olonisakin, 2008:73). In doing so, he was ruthless. 
4.3. Following 
The NPFL used coercion and force to gain a following in Liberia: “If you didn’t join, 
they wouldn’t feed you. If you left, the rebels would kill you”  (Murphy, 2003:73). 
Most members of the NPFL joined as a direct result of the violence targeted toward 
them under Doe’s regime. Fear was a major factor in the recruitment of NPFL 
followers. Taylor’s force included dissidents from Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana and 
Gambia. The NPFL had no ideology, no objectives and no real strategy, but only to 
maintain power. Doe therefore “ethnicized” the security forces. For example, the 
Mandingo were recruited before Doe was overthrown in 1990 (Weiss, 2005:23). 
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The RUF, as well as the NPFL, focused on attracting armed young men who had 
either previously joined militias and private armies, or who seeked “personal 
opportunity and safety” alongside the RUF or NPFL (Reno, 2002:843). These youths 
were considered “lumpen” and consisted of the rarray boys, the san-san (illicit 
diamond diggers) and the Mende (ethnic group) (Murphy, 2003:65). The Mende 
were used by Momoh to fight against the RUF. They were also known as the 
“Kamajors” (Cornwell, 1998:2). The RUF quickly became a multi-ethnic and religious 
band of “poor young men who sustained themselves by looting the countryside” 
(Little, 2007:285). It is estimated that 50 000 civilians died, and 250 000 fled into 
exile (Little, 2007:285).    
 
In contravention to the Geneva convention, both sought to recruit followers among 
children whom they used as child soldiers. Their methods of recruitment were 
abduction and intimidation. This included cutting off limbs.  
 
The main targets for support in the Liberian civil war were non-combatants. Civilians 
were convinced that the Liberian government wanted to rid the country of the Gio 
and Mano tribes (Alao, Mackinlay, Olonisakin, 1999:20). The brutal rule of Doe and 
his Krahn led to civilian support (or raw recruits) for the rebel faction, the NPFL. 
People came in wanting to kill because of Doe’s unleashing of terror on civilians in 
the Nimba County (North-central Liberia). Taylor initially provided these children with 
training, food, shelter and ‘family’. He created a “small boys unit” and opened up 
prisons to unleash inmates and organize them into factions. The NPFL in turn 
terrorized the Doe supporters, mostly Krahn and Mandingo. The use of child fighters 
contributed toward the war. The greatest obstacle to peace was “warlordism and the 
proliferation of factions” (Alao, Mackinlay, Olonisakin, 1999:21). The NPFL’s rapid 
success and popularity, because of the brutality of Doe, consequentially gave them 
mass support and they quickly moved toward Monrovia, the capital (Alao, Mackinlay, 
Olonisakin, 1999:22).  
The Liberian civil war, unlike the Sierra Leonean civil war, had its roots deeply 
entrenched in ethnicity. Doe’s military officers were of the Krahn ethnic group and 
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they focused on looting the Gio and Mano ethnic tribes (Ellis, 1995:2). The Krahn 
was considered to be at the bottom of the social hierarchy in Liberia and made up 
5% of the total population (Young, 1999:6). This group was the NPFL’s main 
opposition targets. They were from the south-east of Liberia, close to the Ivory 
Coast border, representing the “one-at-a time cigarette sellers, prostitutes and 
enlisted men” (Meredith, 2005:548). Ethnic groups, other than the Krahn, such as 
the Gio and Mano tribes, supported the NPFL (Ellis, 1995:2). 
In Sierra Leone, mining had brought profit, however the revenue was located toward 
the elite and not the ordinary citizen. Politicians, chiefs and the Lebanese traders 
were the beneficiaries of the diamonds (Zack-Williams, 1999:148). Hence, the RUF 
targeted the “declassed” citizen and to exploit the deeds of the elite in order to gain 
support, in Sierra Leone. They targeted farmers, chiefs, students, elders and armed 
forces students who were willing to fight against the APC in Sierra Leone (Zack-
Williams, 1999:148). In this respect, the war in Sierra Leone did not take the ethnic 
character as in many other wars in Africa, and especially in Liberia.  
 
Child soldiers, especially in Charles Taylor’s NPFL and Sankoh’s RUF, were a common 
phenomenon. They were not natural followers. Children were often recruited out of 
their homes and orphanages, trained to kill. The children, as young as eight years 
old, were recruited from the streets of Freetown (Kaldor, 2006:99). Their 
recruitment included a meal ticket, shelter and revenge killing. Through the use of 
child soldiers and terror tactics, Sankoh won large parts of the diamond mines, 
arguing that: 
 
“They are good in ambush situations, one of the main combat tactics and - 
separated by war from their kin - are fiercely loyal to their bra (Krio for “big 
brother”), the officer responsible for recruiting and training them” (Meredith, 
2005:563).  
 
Because of the patron-client dynamic within the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, children involved experienced a breakdown in their traditional “kinship 
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security” (Murphy, 2003:62). Children may therefore become followers only in return 
for a certain type of security they now found in the hands of the militias, 
commanders and chiefs. They were introduced in a non-traditional, militia type 
family. Their identity and safety was now found in the guns they carried (Murphy, 
2003:63).  
4.4. Ideology 
The core weakness in Taylor’s association with the RUF was “its reliance on 
interests, not ideology”  (Reno, 2007:79). Alao, Mackinlay and Olonisakin (1999:24) 
state that “Most of the Americo-Liberian politicians had an impression of Taylor as a 
Machiavellian tactician who placed his own ambition and self-interest before any 
group solidarity”.  
 
In the initiating stages of the 1991 invasion from “Greater Liberia”, the RUF had a 
vague populist agenda. However, this was short lived. The RUF ruled through fear 
and brutality, looting and plundering. They had no ideology and no political strategy 
(Hough, 2007:17). They therefore had little support from the masses. Their only 
tactic and ideology was money and brute force. The Sierra Leonean influence in the 
rebel force of 1991, alongside Taylor and Sankoh, did not come from a particular 
ethnic group and was rooted in economically and politically excluded individuals 
(Zack-Williams, 1999:147).  
 
The RUF and NPFL did little to “advertise a particular ideological plan to local people” 
(Reno, 2002:843). The two rebel movements did not have formal civil or military 
administrations in the areas that they occupied. There was thus no broad popular 
support for either the RUF or the NPFL, since the population mostly fled to 
government-held areas, away from the rebel-occupied areas (Reno, 2002:843). The 
goal for the RUF and NPFL, was to battle local rivals in order to gain more precious 
territory. This was done while acquiring an abundance of wealth, increasing their 
criminal networking (Reno, 2002:843). There was little pretence of any ideology. 
 
Sankoh’s justification for fighting was not to revolutionize Sierra Leone for the 
benefit of the masses, but to replace an “old patronage network” with his own 
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personal set-up (Reno, 2002:853). He never wanted to rebuild the government or 
the state,  he was simply intrigued with personal well being and wealth: 
 
“We in the RUF believe in wealth, arms and power in the hands of the people…we’re 
not going to give up diamonds or our guns to anybody” (Reno, 2002:853).  
4.5. Organization 
Charles Taylor NPFL, and Sankoh’s RUF, fall under Clapham’s “warlord insurgencies” 
(Bøås & Dunn, 2007:15). According to Clapham (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:17), modern 
armed guerrillas no longer brand themselves according to Cold War ideology. Their 
networks were lacking in structure and organisation. 
  
Ellis in Bøås and Dunn (2007:27) argue that the actors in the Liberian war used 
cultural resources to ‘control’ their following. The RUF’s world of controlling and 
sustaining a following was based around “a degree of practical Green Book 
egalitarianism”  (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:27). The RUF attracted many of those “who 
were victims of the crisis of the postcolonial mode of accumulation: those who failed 
to find jobs after their elementary, secondary and even university education” (Zack-
Williams, 1999:147). The RUF is argued to have been revolutionaries “who were 
inspired by the notion of a THIRD WAY as advocated in Gadaffi’s Green Book and 
trained in guerrilla warfare in Benghazi” (Zack-Williams, 1999:147). But unlike the 
revolutionaries, the NPFL and RUF never bothered about winning the “hearts and 
minds”, or subscribing to any “ism” of any kind. They did not bother with 
organisation either, except for selling resources that were looted. 
In 1990, several hundred of Taylor’s fighters broke away to form INPFL 
(Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia), which also occupied part of 
Monrovia, lead by Yomie Johnson (Ellis, 1995:3). Monrovia was divided into three 
zones, each occupied by a separate group. An attepmt at peace through the 
Cotonou Agreement (partnership agreement between the EU and African, Pacific and 
Caribbean states) failed. Instead numerous ethnic militias arose in the dire situation 
(Ellis, 1995:6). Hence, the NPFL had to fight a war on at least two fronts (Alao, 
Mackinlay, Olonisakin, 1999:23). 
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Taylor initially waged war from the countryside against Doe (Alao, Mackinlay, 
Olonisakin, 1999:22). The NPFL had small numbers and poor equipment. Marauding 
gangs swept through the countryside, attacking the Krahn. Drugs, alcohol and rape 
played a large role in Taylor’s gangs. They often used symbolism of painted faces 
and women’s wigs believing that they had superpowers. The young fighters wore 
women’s clothing, shower caps or women’s wigs and human bones (Ellis, 1995:1). 
Ellis (1995:1) states that the Liberian civil war “topped and surpassed all other wars, 
in form of character, in intensity, in depravity, in savagery, in barbarism and in 
horror”.  
The RUF and the NPFL had a close relationship. Taylor supported the RUF since the 
invasion of Sierra Leone in 1991 (Momoh, 2000:4). From the onset of the civil war in 
Sierra Leone in 1991, Liberia acted as “banker, trainer and mentor to the RUF, 
although the Liberian connection was hardly new” (Smillie, Gberie, Hazleton, 
2000:6). Taylor played an intricate role in the RUF’s support base and introduced the 
RUF to a number of influential players, namely Libya’s Muammar Ghaddafi. It’s 
alleged that he sponsored the training of Sankoh and his soldiers. Sankoh not only 
fought for the NPFL prior to the inception of the RUF but also followed the NPFL’s 
horrific methods and tactics of recruiting child soldiers. The aim of the RUF-NPFL 
alliance was to control the diamond mines of the Kono region and the greater Sierra 
Leone. But first the APC government (of Joseph Momoh) had to first be overthrown. 
Many of the recruits in the RUF were unemployed, urban youth, namely the “rarray 
boys”. They were easily recruited because of their poor socio-economic backgrounds 
(Momoh, 2000:4).  
 
The children were promoted through atrocities they committed. Monrovia soon 
became under siege, and starvation was vivid. This led to the Krahn rebelling 
(Meredith, 2005:558). “Hacking off hands and feet” became a brutal trademark to 
instill fear in the population within the RUF (Meredith, 2005:564). Boys were used as 
“mules to transport illicit goods across the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia” 
(Weiss, 2005:41). Looting was an everyday occurrence and the RUF took through 
force whatever they wanted (Meredith, 2005:564). Their tactic was brute force. 
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Sexual violence, especially targeted at women and girls became a tactic of the RUF. 
They strived to dominate women in all aspects of society. Women were abducted 
and subjected to sexual violence as well as forced to do “housework, farm work and 
serve as a military porters” (Little, 2007:285). The RUF’s tactic of coercion became 
even more prominent once the Sierra Leonean civil war was at its height, and socio-
economic conditions of civilians at its lowest. Forced recruitment and abduction of 
soldiers, especially child soldiers, became more common (McIntyre, 2004:74).  
 
Their organization was not hierarchical. Sankoh was considered the “Pa” of the 
movement and Taylor the “godfather”, because most soldiers were abducted and 
removed from their original traditional structures of authority (Bøås & Dunn, 
2007:29). Soldiers gladly accepted Sankoh as their leader even though most of them 
never saw him since he was in exile most of the time. The RUF followed a “roam in 
the bush” strategy of warfare and it is argued that these factions usually are less 
interested in capturing the state (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:34). Whereas, the NPFL in 
Liberia followed a “main road” approach, wanting more central control, “road 
running” rebels “are usually engaged in a struggle to capture state power (either 
regionally or nationally), tend to fight in more conventional - style battles, and are 
hierarchically organized. Bush-oath rebel groups, such as the LRA and RUF (during 
part of its existence), tend to be less interested in immediate takeover of the central 
government, tend to employ no conventional tactics (such as ambushes), and are 
less hierarchically organized” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:34). Children were often tattooed 
to show the allegiance to the rebel movement (Murphy, 2003:76).  
 
Taylor, as warlord, had his own regime outside of Monrovia called the “Greater 
Liberia” setting up commercial empires trading gold, timber, ore and diamonds from 
Sierra Leone (Meredith, 2005:561). He had arrangements with Firestone and other 
foreign companies; his largest timber export market was France. For example: A 
“British firm paid Taylor $10 million a month for permission to ship out stockpiled 
iron ore through the deepwater port of Buchanan” (Meredith, 2005:561). But Taylor 
as a warlord in Sierra Leone generated $200 million a year (Meredith, 2005:561). His 
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activities stretched far into Sierra Leone where the most valuable assets were 
diamonds. 
 
Liberia served as the main transit point for Sierra Leonean diamonds. The RUF-NPFL 
relationship was therefore interdependent, with the success of the RUF in Sierra 
Leone being tied to the victory over its diamond regions close to the border of 
Liberia (Murphy, 2003:72).  
 
Political victory in Liberia, in 1997, launched Taylor’s warlord antics in Sierra Leone. 
This lasted till 2003 when he abdicated. It did give him extended support in the 
areas of the military and politics.  
 
The British and the United Nations came to Sierra Leone as peacekeepers. Taylor, 
with the RUF attacks in 2000, could assess if the British and UN forces were willing 
to fight back, and he knew that the RUF struggled because they had a serious 
leadership problem (Reno, 2007:75). The resurgence of the RUF in 1998, deleted 
Sierra Leone as a possible base to invade Liberia (Reno, 2007:76). LURD (Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy) eventually drove deeper into Liberia, 
overwhelming the NPFL control. It is said that the US and Britain backed LURD to 
get rid of Taylor (Reno, 2007:78). But Taylor failed to help the RUF into power in 
Sierra Leone in 2002.  
 
Taylor abdicated and finally left Liberia for exile in Nigeria in 2003. He accepted a 
bargain with an international contact group that offered him no prosecution for war 
crimes in Sierra Leone (Reno, 2007:79). However, Taylor was already charged with 
war crimes in Sierra Leone in secret prior to this. The trials in The Hague 
commenced in July 2009. Taylor was easy to defeat with LURD forces and guidance 
from external forces. However, because LURD was similar to the NPFL, the British 
and US diplomats introduced a President not directly involved with the previous 
conflicts (Reno, 2007:79). This shows the importance of external assistance in 
closing the war. LURD was simply utilized as a tool to get rid of Taylor.  
65 
 
4.6. External Support  
Small arms were easily accessed on the international market in the post-Cold War 
era because of the excess of weapons not being used anymore . Rebel factions such 
as the NPFL and the RUF took advantage of this access and used their resource 
wealth to tap into these armed sources. New technological innovations have also 
helped armed groups, with access to the internet and mobile phones (Bøås & Dunn, 
2007:18).  
 
It is stated that the Liberian civil war would not have resulted in such anarchy if the 
Cold War powers were still present in Africa. Liberia was therefore a result of the 
end of the Cold War and the vacuum of power left by the USA and USSR (Alao, 
Mackinlay, Olonisakin, 1999:24). 
 
Prior to the inception of the Liberian civil war in 1989, Taylor did receive support 
from two West African leaders, Cote d’Ivoire’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Burkina 
Faso’s Blaise Compaore (Akinyemi, 2004:3). This was because Taylor entered 
Northern Liberia through Burkina Faso in 1989, the start of the Liberian civil war. 
However, he did not receive external support as a warlord (1991-2003), except 
through organized crime. Sankoh and the RUF relied on Liberian trade routes for 
reaching diamond markets abroad. 
 
Nevertheless, Taylor supported himself through his criminal networking and through 
controlling Sierra Leone’s diamond regions. He simply aided Sankoh in the control 
over the diamond regions in Sierra Leone.  
 
Sankoh mined diamonds and harboured his international networking while travelling 
overseas, even in the face of economic sanctions. After Sankoh became Vice 
President in 1999 under the Lome peace agreement, signed between the RUF and 
the Sierra Leonean government, he still controlled the diamond regions (Reno, 
2002:853). This was made possible with the substantial support from Taylor and his 
NPFL.  Sankoh died in detention in 2003, and Taylor abdicated in the same year. 
66 
 
4.7. Assessment 
The civil war in Liberia had a spill-over effect into Sierra Leone (and vice versa), 
resulting in the war having a trans-boundary character. The role that Taylor played 
as the leader of the NPFL, and as ‘mentor’ of Sankoh, had a major impact on the 
eventual resolution of the conflict in both nations. Taylor’s interest in Sierra Leone 
was purely economic, as a warlord, while he acted as an insurgent in Liberia toppling 
Doe’s military government, and eventually became President of his own country.  
 
Charles Taylor can be said to be an economic insurgent: “…economic insurgents 
accordingly find they can convince outsiders of their claim to power, provided they 
can capture the country’s capital, or convince outsiders that they should be included 
in a power-sharing arrangement” (Reno, 2001:6).  
 
Taylor, especially for Liberia, was able to utilize his position as president to 
manipulate sovereignty and gain even further access to international business and 
markets. His presidency equipped him with the international recognition, which 
enabled Taylor to remove his political rivals from the political arena (Reno, 
2002:855). It permitted Taylor to sign agreements with major international firms, 
namely, Malaysian timber corporations, converting the rainforests into his own 
personal bank (Reno, 2002:855). From the revenue of these expeditions, he used to 
buy guns, fend off his rivals and further extend his control over precious territory in 
Sierra Leone (Reno, 2002:855). 
 
He was able to create a “Greater Liberia”, a state within a state, for his criminal 
activity. Taylor’s territory boasted its own currency and banking system, television 
and radio network, airfields, and until 1993 a deepwater port (Reno, 1995:113). He 
pioneered a network of foreign firms to exploit and market resources, to finance 
military conquest and to control economically useful territory (Reno, 1995:113). 
 
The revenue from Sierra Leone was used for Taylor’s purpose of becoming President 
in 1997, and aiding the civil war in Sierra Leone. Taylor used his diamond revenue to 
assist the RUF and also supported his former political connections (Reno, 2007:71). 
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Taylor ruled Liberia through his own ideals under a false image of “statehood”. He 
was able to “control his subordinates’ access to markets” (Reno, 2007:71). He had 
the authority and ability to issue passports and manipulated the image of a 
sovereign state at his own dispense.  
 
Taylor thus began as an insurgent in his own country and eventually became 
President. But he ended as a warlord in another. It can be argued that Sankoh was 
simply a ‘puppet’ used by Taylor to achieve his personal enrichment and goals. 
Taylor only aided Sankoh in Sierra Leone to overthrow the APC government because 
it would help Taylor achieve his own goal in Liberia. However, Sankoh never 
achieved Presidency or complete control in Freetown. Sankoh died at the same time 
that Taylor abdicated. Today, Taylor stands trial for human rights violations in Sierra 
Leone.  
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5.    Comparison between Savimbi and Taylor 
 
5.1. Overview 
This is a comparative study describing, analysing and comparing Jonas Savimbi and 
Charles Taylor as warlords and in the context of their areas of activity in Angola and 
Liberia/Sierra Leone respectively.  
The context of this study revolves around Mary Kaldor’s (2006) notion of “new wars” 
with special reference to the thinking of Collier and Reno. They emphasise factors 
and actors such as globalization, identity, resource wars, greed and grievance, 
(vague) nationalism, manipulation of markets, the role of armed youths and warlord 
activities, including illicit looting of scarce resources (in both cases), mainly 
diamonds. 
The work of John Mackinlay (2000) was of great use in understanding the warlord 
phenomenon. Mackinlay sketches a framework of the origins of warlordism and how 
this phenomenon has changed over the last century. Warlordism originated in China, 
after the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 (Mackinlay, 2000:1). The vulnerable state 
seen in China during the early 20th century is similar to the conditions of weak 
states observed in Africa at the start of the 21st century. It is within this context of 
weak central governance that the warlord has made his appearance on the fringes 
of the state where the warlord does not necessarily want to capture the state, but 
through terrorising the local population, wants to loot resources.  Mackinlay (2000:1) 
defines a “warlord” as; 
 
“...the leader of an armed band, possibly numbering up to several thousand fighters, 
who can hold territory locally and, at the same time, act financially and politically in 
the international system without interference from the state in which he is based” .  
 
Mackinlay (2000) makes a distinction between the Chinese warlord and the warlord 
of the 21st century (examples include Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor). The new 
kind of warlord manifested itself after the Cold War to adapt to the changing 
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international environment. The absence of interest from Russia and the USA had 
grave effects on Africa in particular. This lack of interest created a vacuum of power 
to be filled, and when this power gap was not filled, many African states collapsed 
into weak states, extreme poverty and broken bureaucracies. Conflicts ensued within 
these areas of civil war and deteriorated societies. Warlordism flourished. A warlord’s 
survival is guaranteed through seeking “refuge in crisis zones and the lack of 
international commitment to take effective action together” (Mackinlay, 2000:1). The 
warlord thus creates his own economy where his economic survival is based on 
international business ties and local illicit looting of scarce resources. There thus 
exists a link between the warlord and the “failed state” (Mackinlay, 2000:1). 
Mackinlay (2000) further argues that warlordism predates the 21th century and 
suggests that the international community must take a more determined and 
aggressive stance toward dealing with these corrupt individuals.  
 
It is therefore important to distinguish between the warlord of the early 20th century 
and the warlord operating in the 21st century. Globalization had created and opened 
a new range of possibilities for warlordism to flourish and sustain itself in the 21st 
century (often through criminal networks). Electronics and inventive measures have 
meant that warlords can sustain themselves through international business and 
organizations, while still keeping control over their local areas which they defend 
ruthlessly. There is also the development of a global business culture and a 
movement away from ethnicity (Mackinlay, 2000:3). However, in Savimbi and 
Taylor’s cases, we see an ethnic element present in both civil wars, but ethnicity was 
stronger in Savimbi's case.  
Both Savimbi and Taylor were more than the typical warlord. Both began their 
fighting careers as insurgents: Taylor against the Doe regime in Liberia and Savimbi 
against a colonial power, the Portuguese. Taylor became the President of his own 
country (Liberia) while being warlord in another (Sierra Leone). Savimbi, on the 
other hand, had a long career as an insurgent and a rebel in Angola (1960-1992), 
before becoming warlord in his last decade (1992-2002). On the other hand, there 
are also many differences between these two warlords.  
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For a better understanding of Savimbi and Taylor, this study compared them in 
terms of Thomas H. Greene’s typology of revolutionary movements and especially 
their leaderships, following, ideology, organisation, techniques and external support. 
This, together with the thinking of Kaldor, Collier, Reno and Mackinlay, provide the 
background against which two African warlords – Savimbi and Taylor, can be better 
understood. 
5.2.    Similarities of factors and actors 
With regard to similarities between Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone, authors have 
pointed toward the civil wars in these nations as having characteristics of new wars 
generally, and resource wars specifically. Both were characterised by global crime 
networking. 
 
These networks are highly criminalized and usually link into “transcontinental 
smuggling and other grey commercial networks to satisfy their special requirements” 
(Duffield, 2000:14). In other words, for Taylor and Savimbi to have created their 
extensive networks, and to have survived as long as they did, they had to act locally 
but “think globally” (Duffield, 2000:14). Liberia and Angola also experienced a 
considerable breakdown in state legitimacy as a result of patrimonialism and 
corruption – rubber in Liberia and oil and diamonds in Angola. But the state had lost 
its ability to function properly, creating a power gap left to fill. Shadowy actors 
emerged to fill this space. The distinction between “private and public, soldier and 
civilian”  has become blurred with the onset of these “new wars” (Kaldor, 2006:97).  
 
Savimbi and Taylor have imparted their own personal networks in the place of 
legitimate state institutions. In both cases, their careers ended abruptly. Savimbi 
was assassinated in 2002 and Taylor abdicated in 2003, only to later stand trial in 
the ICC for human rights violations in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, the wars in 
Liberia/Sierra Leone and Angola cannot simply be defined as “resource wars” only. 
Bøås and Dunn (2007:1) state that these wars are historically grounded, defined by 
factors unique to themselves.  
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“The usual definition of a resource war is that of an armed conflict waged to control 
valuable natural resources. While resource control may be the main factor driving a 
conflict, wars are too complex to be attributed to a single motivation” (Le Billon, 
2000:22).  
 
In Liberia one complex factor was the role of Americo-Liberian rulers in the 
exploitation of resources, while in Angola the anti-Portuguese revolution had a 
lasting impact on complexities there. In Sierra Leone, adjacent to Liberia, a resource 
war over diamonds raged. 
 
Paul Collier  in Reno  (2000:221) notes that “poor states that are very dependent on 
natural resource exports are most vulnerable to civil wars”.  Violence is an intricate 
part of resource exploitation and the political economy of it. As mentioned, the role 
of outside markets and criminal networks played a major role in the ongoing civil 
wars in Liberia/Sierra Leone and Angola. Whether a resource is scarce or abundant, 
is irrelevant (Le Billon, 2000:26). In Angola, there is an abundance of oil and 
diamonds and whether they are scarce or abundant, they still represent a “value” 
(Le Billon, 2000:26). Hence, there is a correlation between “value and violence” (Le 
Billon, 2000:26).  This applied to resource wars of West Africa as well. Collier (Reno, 
2000:221) also makes the point that the situation in Angola was less about 
“grievances” and more about “predation”. In other words, diamonds made UNITA so 
rich that nothing anybody could offer could compare. Hence,  further ‘predation’ 
offered more reward (Reno, 2000:221).  
 
UNITA never benefited from oil, only from diamonds and ivory. The MPLA ruling elite 
benefited from oil. In Angola, it was oil and diamonds that contributed considerably 
to the ongoing civil war (Reno, 2000:219). Over the time of Angola’s existence as a 
state, violence has had a direct link with its abundance of these natural resources 
(Le Billon, 2000:21). The role that raw materials played in the Angolan civil war, on 
both fronts, show that resources had an undeniable contribution to the longevity of 
the war itself. Diamonds, for UNITA, attracted private military companies using 
“industrial security” as a smokescreen for illegal activity (Reno, 2000:220). The 
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external powers’ main focus was to make foreign policy towards Angola that benefits 
from resources such as oil in Cabinda.  
 
Angola became more heavily dependent on revenue from such resources, further 
interlinking firms, financial institutions, Angolan state officials and foreign state 
officials (Reno, 2000:220). This resulted in Angola’s government unable to build an 
efficient state. Political networking therefore increased due to the easy access from 
export revenues, further fuelling patronage politics and corruption (Reno, 2000:221). 
Paul Collier in Reno (2000:221) notes that “corruption is integral to the political 
systems, such as in Angola, since these regimes find that they can build loyal 
political networks and buy compliance through the distribution of patronage to key 
individuals”. In other words “the more riches, the more war, and the more suffering 
for the people” (Le Billon, 2000:21). Warlordism thus became an accident that had 
to happen.  
 
Liberia and Sierra Leone paint a similar picture with regard to “value and violence”.  
In Liberia, Charles Taylor attained Presidency in 1997, through, firstly controlling 
resource rich regions of the country. In Liberia he controlled the rubber, timber, iron 
ore regions, and in Sierra Leone the diamond fields (Le Billon, 2000:27). In this 
specific case, controlling the state provides a direct link to controlling the natural 
resources.  
 
Le Billon (2000:28) offers an explanation of “warlords and geographical importance”. 
Warlords, like Charles Taylor and Jonas Savimbi, controll a certain area through 
waging war. They do not obey higher authority and their ability to maintain and 
operate a warlord economy, is the key to success (Le Billon, 2000:28). This keeps 
competing groups at bay. The key to being a successful warlord, according to 
Mackinlay’s (2000:1) definition, is that the actor is able to create a war economy. In 
sum, the abuse of natural resources for the personal gain of warlords and local 
strongmen has fuelled a conflict that would otherwise have been exhausted 
(because of a lack of funding) (Weiss, 2005:10). In Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
however, resources became a pawn over which local strongmen and warlords fought 
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over and over to “seize control over small, economically valuable pieces of territory 
and use them as bases from which to compete with one another for control over 
what remains of these states” (Reno, 2000:223).  
 
Kaldor’s (2006) “new war” theory is certainly appropriate in the two cases presented. 
Globalization according to Kaldor has played an important role in the creation of the 
African state. New actors have emerged out of this context including “new 
supranational, international and local actors” (Duffield, 2000:5).  Hence, 
“polyarchical networks” have replaced “hierarchical networks” replacing 
“government” with “governance”, even that of the warlord’s networks (Duffield, 
2000:5).   
  
Kaldorian “new wars”, contrary to “old wars” is where the state is extremely weak, 
has no monopoly of power, and is thwarted by private armies, militias and criminal 
bands. Violence is predatory and the distinction between civilian and soldier is 
blurred. There are no rules, no uniforms and the breaking down of the state leads to 
the breaking down of society as a whole (Mackinlay, 2000:3). War is therefore no 
longer a “rational state activity”, but greed is undeniable for all parties to such 
conflicts (Kaldor, 2006:20).  
 
Assessing Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor as actors, it is apparent that they 
emerged as a result of the global political and economic conditions as a consequence 
of globalization, the end of the Cold War, and illicit economics in which greed played 
bigger roles than grievance, at least as far as the élites are concerned. Grievance is 
only for the masses. 
 
In Angola, the state was under an authoritarian type of colonial rule. When the 
Portuguese left in 1976, the three liberation movements (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA), 
entered a struggle for power that lasted 27 years. There was therefore never a 
stable state to begin with. The FNLA, UNITA and the MPLA, had their own private 
militias, occupying different regions within the weak state with each faction 
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gathering a different ethnic following. UNITA operated in the diamond regions as 
well and this prolonged the war. 
 
In Liberia, Taylor opposed the pro-American Doe regime. The Doe regime was an 
oligarchy, comprised of a “minority", the Krahn ethnic group. The state was highly 
centralised but weak and corrupt. A coup occurred in 1990, when Samuel Doe was 
ousted by Charles Taylor as grievances mounted. Violence became central in 
controlling the population and occupying certain resource rich regions of Liberia. And 
as he became richer after 1990, Taylor set his sights on the diamonds of 
neighbouring Sierra Leone.  
 
In Angola, the three liberation movements revolved around three different ethnic 
groups. Identity politics was more prominent in Angola and contributed to the 
animosity among the three factions. Savimbi’s UNITA consisted of the largest ethnic 
group in Angola, the Ovimbundu, fighting mainly the Mbunda and Mulattos. 
Although leadership was intellectual, the three movements had rural ethnic support 
bases. Savimbi’s UNITA focused on Mao Zedong’s guerrilla warfare, and winning “the 
hearts and minds” of the Ovimbundu people. On the other hand, Charles Taylor 
considered himself an intellectual and elite. However, the ethnic violence present in 
Liberia differed from that in Angola. Ethnic violence in Liberia was more a result of 
grievances against the Krahn in government, and therefore other ethnic groups 
simply reacted through violence. Liberia’s war was thus a result of the government 
excluding key groups from power (Adebajo, 2004:2). Unemployed youths from a low 
socio-economic background became the “fodder for the sub region’s warlords, 
perpetuating horrendous crimes against innocent civilians” (Adebajo, 2004:2).  
Savimbi as an anti-Portuguese insurgent also fought for power just like Taylor 
wanted to seize power in Liberia. But Savimbi as warlord fought less for the seizure 
of power than for personal enrichment, just as Taylor was after Sierra Leone’s 
diamonds, not power in that state.  
 
As actors, Savimbi and Taylor started their wars as a result of grievances their 
supporters had against their respective governments. Taylor had grievances against 
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the pro-American Samuel Doe regime in Liberia, while Savimbi firstly had grievances 
against the colonial Portuguese that later shifted toward the ruling MPLA regime. 
However, eventually, both actors became greedy. Savimbi looted diamonds and 
ivory while Taylor allied with Foday Sankoh's RUF, in eventual pursuit of occupying 
the greater Mano River Basin as well as diamonds. His tactics were brutal and he 
was charged by the ICC for human rights violations in 2004. The court case opened 
in 2009. Savimbi was less brutal than Taylor. Both Savimbi and Taylor had therefore 
begun their leadership roles as revolutionaries of the left: Savimbi as Maoist, and 
Taylor as a protégé of Gaddafi, whose doctrine lacked guerrilla strategies. Thereafter 
they became opportunistic warlords. 
 
Another important similarity between Savimbi and Taylor as warlords was their 
ability to manoeuvre economic markets toward their liking. UNITA, until the 1980s, 
was reliant on Cold War support. However, with the end of the Cold War, external 
support in the form of the superpowers was no longer available. UNITA survived 
through adapting and shifting its international and local trans-border linkages with 
powerful actors (Duffield, 2000:7). Since 1992 “UNITA has consistently controlled 
around 60-70% of Angola’s diamond production. To date (in 2000), this is estimated 
to have generated US $ 3.7 billion in revenue” (Duffield, 2000:13).  
 
In similar fashion, Charles Taylor of Liberia utilized trans-border-trade to keep afloat 
his NPFL and attain political power in Liberia in 1990 through a successful coup and 
in 1997 through the ballot box: “Between 1992 and 1996, Charles Taylor is 
estimated to have made between U.S. $400 million and $450 million per year from 
the conflict in Liberia” (Duffield, 2000:13). Hence, trans-border trade has contributed 
considerably to the influence that these two actors had on their regions and states.  
 
They both occupied certain “resource rich” regions. Taylor, through Sankoh, 
occupied the Kono diamond region in Sierra Leone, and Savimbi occupied the 
Cuango Valley on the Angolan highlands where ivory and diamonds were plentiful. 
Savimbi as well as Taylor created “a state within a state”. Savimbi created 
“protective hamlets” for his people, with headquarters in Jamba, with its own 
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‘economy’ and sustainability while Taylor created “Greater Liberia” with its own 
currency and water port, while exercising influence in Kono.  The difference here 
however is that Savimbi won local support under Maoist ideology, while Taylor ruled 
through fear and brute force.  
 
Both used diamond revenues to support their respective factions. They traded 
weapons for diamonds and further fuelled the war. They were the godfathers of 
“blood diamonds”. Both were charismatic leaders, Savimbi more so than Taylor. Both 
manipulated the youth and made use of child soldiers. Both presented a new 
“family”, with Taylor and Savimbi as the “fathers” of their respective movements. 
Guns represented power in the hands of children although Savimbi did have a 
guerrilla and semi-conventional army with reasonably well-trained fighters.  
 
Even though UNITA generally avoided the forcible recruitment of children, they did 
implement a “tax system” whereby traditional chiefs (sobas) in areas controlled by 
UNITA would have to “provide (primarily young) people to be drafted into JURA (a 
form of ritual celebration adopted by UNITA) for service” (McIntyre, 2004:53). This 
however changed in the 1990s, as UNITA became less focused on Maoist ideology 
and more fixed on profit. During this time UNITA slowly departed from its 
‘responsibility’ toward its rural support, resulting in recruitment being more forced 
with the use of intimidation (McIntyre, 2004:53). Sobas were used to intimidate 
families to ‘give up’ their children, as well as hijackings and abduction (McIntyre, 
2004:53).  
 
Finally, both had foreign education: Savimbi in Switzerland, and Taylor in the USA. 
Then there were also many differences between them.  
5.3.   Differences of factors and actors 
There are a number of differences with regard to the factors in the context of 
Liberia/Sierra Leone and Angola. Firstly, Charles Taylor emerged as a typical warlord 
in the post-Cold War era, while Savimbi was firstly part of a liberation movement 
and cooperated personally and directly with the Cold War powers during the Cold 
War era. Savimbi only became a typical warlord, after 1992, when he lost the 
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Angolan elections.  Although Taylor was more a product of globalization, Savimbi 
was a product of the Cold War, but his undoing came in 2002 when he was 
assassinated allegedly because he had no Cold War support anymore. 
 
Taylor and Sankoh used unemployed youths in West Africa, while Savimbi’s UNITA 
was a peasant based organization. He relied mainly on the mass support of the 
Ovimbundu ethnic group because of Savimbi’s loyalty during the colonial war. His 
initial aim was to attain political power in Angola, which is what Taylor accomplished 
in Liberia. He was therefore an insurgent and guerrilla fighter before he became a 
warlord. In line with his Maoist training, Savimbi’s faction was based on loyalty of 
the local population. He was able to foster agricultural production and provide (to an 
extent) for ‘his’ people. He was considered a “champion of democracy” in the 
beginning of the civil war. But like Taylor he ended as “a ruthless dictator” towards 
the end of the war (Meredith, 2005:603-505). But he lacked Taylor’s brutality. 
 
Charles Taylor was thus a more ruthless warlord. He did not follow a specific 
strategy or ideology. He simply wanted economic power through the manipulation of 
the diamond fields in Sierra Leone after he attained power in Liberia. He was 
therefore, an insurgent in Liberia against Doe’s government and a warlord in Sierra 
Leone as an ally of Foday Sankoh’s RUF. Taylor’s NPFL had no particular ethnic 
group following except that it fought the Krahn. However, during his successful coup 
against the Doe regime in Liberia (1990), Taylor (for a short period) gained a 
following of the Gio and Mano tribes of Liberia.   
 
Unlike Angola where the initial conflict was revolutionary, the war in Liberia was a 
war born out of “restless youth, economically marginalized by a failing post-colonial 
patronage system and spurred on by a spurious identification with TV heroes such 
as Rambo” (Parsons, 2004:49). Angola did have characteristics of youth 
involvement, but this was more in the form of students and intellectuals 
revolutionizing against the Portuguese colonial regime. Savimbi seldom had such a 
support base. The ideology of the war, however, changed after 1975 in Angola when 
the anti-Portuguese revolution turned into an Angolan civil war with Savimbi still an 
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important actor. The war increasingly became a war revolving around the three 
respective revolutionary leaders and their ethnic factions, Neto’s FNLA, Dos Santos’ 
MPLA and Savimbi’s UNITA (Parsons, 2004:49). The MPLA took power after the 
departure of the Portuguese, while Savimbi kept on fighting. 
 
Savimbi’s ideology was based on Mao Zedong’s rural guerrilla warfare, winning the 
“hearts and minds” of the people. Unlike Taylor, he did not use terror as a tactic. 
Similar to Chinese history of Maoism, Savimbi had to capture the support of the 
‘masses’ and through this, attain political dominance. However, Savimbi, post 1992, 
turned into a typical warlord. His ideology and tactic wavered during this time until 
his death. During this time, UNITA traded in diamonds and ivory and focused more 
on coercion and less on loyalty. He also had no external support anymore.  
 
Savimbi’s strategy and ideology went much deeper than Taylor’s. Taylor, on the 
other hand, never had an ideology.  His tactic was brute force, and he never wanted 
to cater for the masses. He was thus a more typical warlord, especially after joining 
forces with Foday Sankoh's RUF. These two allies became hungry for attaining 
personal profit and political power. His main aim was not political transformation but 
economic domination of the Mano River Basin and the Kono diamond region in Sierra 
Leone.  
 
Taylor never wanted to revolutionize Liberia, he simply wanted to establish his own 
patron-client networking within government. While Savimbi genuinely fought in the 
colonial struggle against the Portuguese, Taylor had no such credentials. After 
staging a successful coup in 1990, Taylor achieved Presidency in his home of Liberia 
in 1997, while Savimbi never gained presidential power in Angola.  
 
Unlike Taylor, Savimbi had a good external support base during the Angolan civil 
war. He had the support of the Americans, South Africans, Zambia and Zaire. 
However, after the Cold War, these networks had to be reworked and without the 
support of the South Africans and Americans, Savimbi turned warlord after he had 
lost the elections of 1992.  
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Taylor did not receive external support as a warlord. He created his own personal 
international networks to support his political and economic aims. He only received 
training in Libya, along with Sankoh and had some support prior to the invasion of 
Liberia from Burkina Faso.  
 
Savimbi, as an insurgent had received training in China, this is where he picked up 
his Maoist strategy and principles. Savimbi’s UNITA became a semi-conventional 
force, while Taylor’s NPFL was simply a group of “lumpen youths” without ideology 
or vision and fighting civilians brutally. They were therefore more brutal than 
UNITA’s soldiers. Taylor’s NPFL looted and plundered, hacking off hands of innocent 
civilians and forcing children to join, while Savimbi sought the support of the 
masses, using revolutionary sentiment as his force. Savimbi’s training, organization 
and ideology of UNITA were therefore much more organized and coherent than 
Taylor’s rebel group, the NPFL. Savimbi also had a secure military base in Jamba, 
while Taylor had no permanent military base anywhere, except as President of 
Liberia, which had a very weak army.  
 
The main difference between Savimbi and Taylor as warlords was thus that Savimbi 
was an insurgent and a guerrilla fighter who ultimately turned into a warlord. Taylor 
began as an insurgent but turned into a warlord in a different country, Sierra Leone. 
They were both affected by the end of the Cold War and had considerable influence 
within their regions and internationally. 
 
Finally, Savimbi participated in only one election in 1992, and lost, whereafter he 
became warlord. Taylor also participated in only one election, in 1997, and won. 
However, he was a warlord in a different country. Savimbi was assassinated whereas 
Taylor stands trial for warlord activities in Sierra Leone.  
5.4.    Conclusion  
The purpose and significance of this study was to evaluate the factors that led to the 
creation of warlords in Angola and Liberia.  The study has established that new wars 
developed out of the situations in both Liberia and Angola. Actors involved were 
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driven by grievance (followers) and eventually greed (leaders). Bøås and Dunn 
(2007) have argued that guerrilla movements are historically grounded and that the 
“new wars and resource wars” are too narrow in explaining this phenomenon. 
Hence, these civil wars not only fell into these two categories, but other underlying 
social elements also contributed. The wars in Angola and Liberia both started with 
leaders having grievances against their respective governments (Savimbi against the 
Salazar regime in Angola and Taylor against the Samuel Doe regime in Liberia). Only 
later, greed stepped in with the involvement of illicit diamond smuggling, and 
warmaking adding characteristics of resource wars. Resources paved the way for the 
development of typical war economies in both Angola and Liberia/Sierra Leone. This 
further supported criminal networking and patronage politics in both cases. 
 
The study has been specifically interesting since the two warlords (Jonas Savimbi 
and Charles Taylor) originated out of different eras, Savimbi out of the Cold War era 
and Taylor out of globalization and greed.  This factor has shown a significant 
difference in their paths to becoming warlords, their leadership skills and the 
organization of their factions. They both fall under Clapham’s (2000) warlord 
insurgencies and Mackinlay’s (2000) characteristics. They both created a different 
form of political authority within their areas of activity and were capable of running 
extensive criminal networking but without explicit external support. As Kaldor (2006) 
argues, Taylor was a result of globalization, but Savimbi was more a result of the 
end of the Cold War and Angola’s role as a “pawn” in the Cold War. Identity politics 
also played a role in both Liberia and Angola, but Savimbi used ethnicity to a greater 
extent. Taylor was more brutal, and therefore more of a typical warlord than 
Savimbi. They were both interested in personal enrichment. They both made use of 
the weapons acquired on the international market, trading diamonds for arms.  
 
Thomas H. Greene’s typology (1984) directed the structure of this study. Even-
though he focuses more on revolutionary movements, his structure was applicable 
to both Savimbi and Taylor. It was useful in guiding the study with the construction 
of similarities and differences between the two warlords.  
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Savimbi based his leadership skills on his authority and the weight that this carried 
throughout his faction, UNITA since the 1960s. Taylor was a typical strongman. 
Savimbi’s UNITA had a rural peasant following, mostly comprised of the Ovimbundu 
ethnic group, while Taylor’s followers were unemployed urban youths. Savimbi used 
nationalist and Maoist ideology, while Taylor utilized greed and power to his 
advantage. Savimbi’s organization of UNITA was more hierarchical and structured 
politically and militarily than that of Taylor’s NPFL. However, the organization of 
UNITA also changed into organized looting. Since Savimbi’s becoming warlord after 
1992, the techniques of the two warlords therefore differed. Savimbi used guerrilla 
warfare that later developed into conventional attacks against the MPLA. Taylor’s 
faction, on the other hand, committed extreme brutalities without a strategy. 
Savimbi had various external supporters during the Cold War, while Taylor did not 
receive any external support during his time as a warlord. 
 
Mackinlay (2000) has highlighted the differences and similarities between the 
warlord of the early 20th century and the more contemporary warlord. He has also 
imparted greater understanding of the surrounding factors that contribute to the 
creation of the warlord. 
 
Future research can be conducted on the next ‘phase’ of warlord politics, in other 
words, how the weak African state will further evolve within the changing global 
context and the role that warlords and rebels will play in this new context.  How will 
their networks and environment change with the increasing role of the global civil 
society, international conduct and the punishment of warlords. Will warlord politics 
fade in Africa or is there hope for a more stable Africa?  Is there a possibility of 
‘other’ wars developing like piracy? How can the international arena tackle the issues 
that breed in such states? How can criminals be held accountable and how can 
international criminal networking be controlled and monitored? Can the international 
community conduct itself in such a way as to inhibit or contribute to the 
development of warlord politics worldwide?  Should diplomats engage with warlords? 
Questions surrounding the ICC (International Criminal Court) and its jurisdiction over 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in trying warlords like Charles 
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Taylor may be explored. Furthermore, the question on how the ICC as a global body 
of justice can gain further authority over governments committing crimes against 
their own people? How the ICC will evolve to tackle the issue of nations that won’t 
comply with the Rome Statute in order to harbour criminals.   
 
In sum, both Charles Taylor and Jonas Savimbi had different paths to their 
destruction. The loss of human life traded for profit had caught up with the two 
warlords. Eventually, Charles Taylor abdicated (2003) and Savimbi was assassinated 
(2002). But their legacies live on.  
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